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This thesis focuses on introducing novel algorithms in information security through
studying successful algorithms in bioinformatics and adapting them to solve some
open problems in information security. Although, the problems in both bioin-
formatics and information security are different, yet, they might be considered
very similar when it comes to identifying and solving them using Stringology
techniques. Different successful bioinformatics algorithms have been studied
and introduced to solve different security problems such as malware detection,
biometrics and big data. Firstly, we present a dynamic computer malware detection
model; a novel approach for detecting malware code embedded in different types
of computer files, with consistency, accuracy and in high speed without excessive
memory usages. This model was inspired by REAL; an efficient read aligner used
by next generation sequencing for processing biological data. In addition, we
introduce a novel algorithmic approach to detect malicious URLs in image secret
communications. Secondly, we also focus on biometrics, specifically fingerprint
which is considered to be one of the most reliable and used technique to identify in-
dividuals. In particular, we introduce a new fingerprint matching technique, which
matches the fingerprint information using circular approximate string matching to
solve the rotation problem overcoming the previous methods’ obstacles. Finally,
we conclude with an algorithmic approach to analyse big data readings from smart
meters to confirm some privacy issues concerns.
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Information security is one of today’s most interesting and challenging topics,
especially if one considers the ever-developing Internet and the increasing number
of online social platforms and services. These services are generating an enormous
amount of data every day and causing a great threat of cybercrime along with it.
For that reason, people, companies and governments are worried about privacy
and how to secure these online data. Information security is no longer just about
technology devices and anti-virus, it is now more about three factors – social,
people and technology – all coming together.
However, we are beginning to see some changes that can improve how we manage
these problems, yet, information security is still a very big aspect when it comes
to handling information.
In this era, everything revolves around information, but not just any type of infor-
mation, specifically cyber information. Everything has evolved around technology;
from an application that lets you order a cup of coffee, to more complex applica-
tions like building factories and performing surgeries.
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Technology has been incorporated into our lives in so many ways; it is now hard to
completely cut it out of our lives. Instead, information is moving at a fast pace all
over the web, so having your information available is a must, but aiming to ensure
the integrity and confidentiality of these information is a true challenge. Regardless
of the type of information, securing it is crucial, depending on it location, size and
accessibility.
The Internet is considered a rich platform of information where many people get
benefits from accessing it, yet, they are being attacked by computer malware and
various other threats which distract them from their normal and efficient work
flow. These types of malware; software that is harmful to both computers and
networks, are so pervasive that anti-virus software companies receive extensive
amounts of malware variants daily; therefore, there is an essential need to improve
their detection techniques, accuracy and speed in order to protect their customers.
Chapter 3 in this thesis is concerned with this type of security problem, we provide
a novel malware detection algorithm and present the implementation and experi-
ment results. Our work on this area has been published in [9] and [4].
Meanwhile, hackers techniques are changing and getting harder and more chal-
lenging for security experts to produce solutions as fast as new types of attacks
emerge by the clock. Hackers have the capability to experiment persistently and to
hit the web with new manifestations of malware, creating cyber-terrorism.
Therefore, “white hat hackers” have been on the chase to create and ramp up
the existing solutions to help mitigate or even sometimes eliminate the risks that
are being exposed. Some hacking techniques are quite old but they are being
modified to engage with the new digital era, such as the art of hiding information,
or “steganography”.
Steganographic techniques started back in ancient Greece, for example, writing
text on wax-covered tablets or shaving the head of a messenger to tattoo a message
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on his head, and after the hair grew back, the message would be undetected until
the head was shaved again.
However, these steganographic techniques now has been developed to hide mal-
ware in images by embedding the malware code along with the image code so
when downloading an innocent image, it will attack the victims’ computer. This
technique only started two years ago, at the end of 2013. In the second part of
Chapter 3 we study the steganography in details and introduce a new detection
technique that can prevent some of the image steganography malicious attacks, the
work on this problem has been published in [5].
Furthermore, focusing on other aspects of information security would be through
looking into problems that may arise with current solutions and try to modify and
update the ways these solutions work. Constantly, creating better, more efficient
and effective solutions to existing problems is a key, the more solutions that emerge,
the stronger and more immune the security is.
Without information security, problems like identity theft and cybercrimes would
be done more often and more easily, for instance, identification and verifications
via biometrics (fingerprint for example) is part of essential regular individuals
activities, therefore, in chapter 4 we revisit the fingerprint matching problem and
try to solve it in a novel technique using approximate circular string matching to
overcome the weaknesses in the previous methods, the corresponding achieve-
ments has been published in [8] and [7].
Moreover, industries now have changed their mind-set when it comes to informa-
tion security, since they have realised that it may only take one action to affect
the whole dynamic of that industry and cost them their reputation and business
continuity. It is not a very different case when it comes to individuals.
Having increasing amounts of identity theft and cybercrime has proved that se-
curing your information is essential. According to [133] “Cyber-crime has been
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estimated to cost the global economy in excess of $445 billion each year.”
One way of providing security control, is to ensure that certain organisations are
abiding by the privacy acts and making sure that the information of individuals
they collect stays confidential during use, transmission and destruction. Therefore,
the United States Privacy Act of 1974 states the following:
“The Privacy Act guarantees three primary rights:
• The right to see records about oneself, subject to Privacy Act exemptions;
• The right to request the amendment of records that are not accurate, relevant,
timely or complete; and
• The right of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasion of
their privacy resulting from the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure
of personal information.“
(The U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, 22-05-2015) [129].
Information security consists of many different aspects, such as the technology
aspect, as well as the human aspect. whereas the latter, has become an increasing
point of attack and always a factor to target, as it is the weakest link in a security
model. Providing sufficient human awareness may help to mitigate the problems
that may arise from social engineered attacks which consist of the most efficient
techniques in gaining classified information. Securing the human is always the
goal, whether it is physically or intellectually.
Providing a global understanding of privacy is also crucial since everything is
connected. Companies today are providing their customers with more integrated
services that will give them more access to their data and daily activities. One such
case, is electricity companies marketing the new smart meters technology as a
beneficial service to reduce electricity usage by monitoring the electricity readings
in real time. Although the users might benefit from this extra service, it will
compromise their privacy by giving the utility constant access to their electricity
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readings. Any kind of information can be used by numerous types of people,
however, unauthorised use of this information is an invasion of privacy and may
lead to severe consequences. In chapter 5 we define the smart meters privacy
problem in details and provide algorithmic data analysis technique to detect private
in-house activities, The corresponding work has be been published in [6].
Finally, securing information is not solely for corporate data, as it should also
consider all types of information since technology is encompassed in our day to
day activities. Creating a canopy of security for all aspects is crucial since it not
only provides confidentiality of the data, but also assures integrity of the data itself.
Information security often talks about the security triad which is the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of data.
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1.2 Bioinformatics
Algorithms in computers and information technology are considered as a tool to
solve problems in many fields and research science areas. This is particularly
true in biological research. Bioinformatics is a relatively new research area that
addresses the need to manage and interpret the data that were generated by genomic
research in the past decade.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary bioinformatics is conceptualising
biology in terms of molecules and applying informatics techniques. In other words,
bioinformatics is a management information system for molecular biology and has
many practical applications [75].
The National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI)[84] defines bioin-
formatics as follows:
"Bioinformatics is the field of science in which biology, computer science, and
information technology merge into a single discipline. The ultimate goal of the
field is to enable the discovery of new biological insights as well as to create a
global perspective from which unifying principles in biology can be discerned
different types of information.”
Also, the Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics describes it as:
“Bioinformatics provides novel methods to store, analyse and visualise this
information — creating new knowledge to enhance our standard of life.”
Moreover, there are three sub-disciplines in bioinformatics. The first, focuses
on the informatics side, and concentrates on the development of new algorithms
and statistics with which to assess relationships among members of large data
sets. The second, focuses on the biology side, and concentrates on the analysis
and interpretation of various types of data including nucleotide and amino acid
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sequences, protein domains and protein structures. Finally, the third, is the result
of the previous two. It concentrates on the development and the implementation of
tools that enable efficient access and management of different types of information.
In general, bionformatices can be defined as well as any use of computers or
specifically algorithms for processing any biologically-derived information [15].
1.3 Bioinformatics and Information Security
In this thesis, different successful bioinformatics algorithms have been studied and
introduced to help in solving different security problems such as malware detection,
biometrics and big data, mixing more than one filed together to solve similar
problems will give the solutions strength and empower them through looking at
similar problems from different aspects. And that is a key factor in this thesis
from detecting malware using an efficient read aligner used by next generation
sequencing for processing biological data to fingerprint matching technique using
circular string matching algorithm that was used to solve human virus problem in
bioinformatics.
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1.4 Algorithms and Complexity
The task of representing information is considered fundamental in computer sci-
ence; however, the main purpose of computer programs is not only to perform
calculations, but also to store, analyse, secure and retrieve information as quickly
as possible. For this reason, the study of data structures and the algorithms that
manipulate them is at the heart of computer science [112].
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins (2 ed.) the word “algorithm”
originally meant the Arabic or decimal notation of numbers. It is a variant, in-
fluenced by the Greek arithmos for “number”, and the Middle English algorism,
which came via Old French from Mediaeval Latin algorismus, derived from the
Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, a 9th century Persian mathematician [3].
Furthermore, the OED defined algorithm as:
“A procedure or set of rules used in calculation and problem-solving; (in later
use spec.) a precisely defined set of mathematical or logical operations for the
performance of a particular task.”
An algorithm is a procedure to accomplish a specific task. It is a method or a
collection of finite number of steps followed to solve a problem. If the problem
is viewed as a function, then the algorithm is an implementation for the function
that transforms an input to the corresponding output. A problem can be solved by
many different algorithms. A given algorithm solves only one defined problem.
Algorithms is the core of every program, and each program will be evaluated by its
speed, accuracy and memory as these are the main factors in designing an efficient
algorithm.
In the most general sense, algorithms are involved in every person’s life, not just
computer programs, as it is the well-defined steps to use the right resources to
solve a well-defined problem. A simple example, is that preparing a meal will
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require specific steps (the recipe) using specific resources (the ingredients), and
manipulating these resources results in an output (the meal), regardless of whether
it is a desirable result or not. However, introducing some modern cooking tech-
niques might speed up the process and provide a better result.
This is the case in different life problems or situations where a person needs to
identify specific steps to solve or reach the best result. Therefore, algorithm design
won’t only solve computational problems but will as well help to solve daily life
problems. Since technology is involved in our life more and more day after day,
creating programs to manage these technologies will be absolutely essential, from
designing the right algorithm to providing the matching required output. Algo-
rithms are not limited to computer science, but can be involved in solving any
kind of problem related to any field or science (e.g. finance, marketing, security,
biology).
Furthermore, many successful companies that are worth billions of pounds started
by designing an algorithm to solve a specific problem, like an online search engine.
Designing an algorithm is done through the description of the algorithm at an
abstract level in pseudo code, and proving its correctness by solving the given
problem in all inputs.
A key factor in designing an efficient algorithm is that the problem should be
formally defined, where the given instance and question are stated clearly. There
are three required properties for a good algorithm design: it should be correct,
efficient and easy to implement [113].
Algorithm analysis is a field in computer science which concentrates primarily on
the algorithm’s performance evaluation and understanding the time complexity of
that algorithm. The “Big O” is the time complexity notation of an algorithm and it
is usually estimated by counting the number of elementary functions performed by
the algorithm in basic operations; multiplication, single addition or subtraction are
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considered to count as a unit time.
The complexity of an algorithm is a function f (n) where is n is the input size.
Generally, there are three cases to find the complexity function f (n):
• Best case: The minimum value of for any possible number of inputs n.
• Worst case: The maximum value of for any possible number of inputs n.
• Average case: The value which is in between maximum and minimum for
any possible number of inputs n.
Algorithms are compared by evaluating their performance and how they respond
in their processing time or working space requirements to different input size.
In fact, the order of growth of the running time of an algorithm gives a simple
evaluation of the algorithm’s efficiency and also allows us to compare the relative
performance of similar algorithms.
The analysis of an algorithm helps us to understand it better, and can suggest
informed improvements. However, measuring the time complexity of an algorithm
usually comes after proving the correctness of the algorithm for the given problem.
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1.5 Thesis Main Contributions
The key contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. The first contribution in the “Malware Detection Techniques” chapter is
solving the malware detection problem using a computational biology tool
through combining the concepts of DNA mapping algorithms and mal-
ware signature-base detection problems. Therefore, this section introduced a
signature-based detection algorithm which uses approximate string matching
techniques, word-level parallelism, sorting algorithms, pigeonhole princi-
ple and other techniques to build and present an efficient linear time and
space algorithm which can be considered a promising solution for detecting
malware signatures, different to what has been done so far in the field. The
main contribution is the novelty of the new detection approach which was
designed in respect to the great threat of daily introduced malware signatures.
The experiment results proved that the proposed algorithm performed with
high accuracy, speed, and less space as required.
In fact, the presented experimental results are very promising, both in terms
of efficiency and sensitivity on the detection process, especially with respect
to the space, as it was able to complete the assignment on high speed, despite
not using a stored pre-processed index of the scanned files. This becomes
especially important considering the problem of the massive amount of
malware-signatures generated daily. The second contribution in the “Mal-
ware Detection Techniques” chapter involves developing an algorithm to
extract the hidden URL in images, and it can be considered as one of the first
tools to detect the hidden URL in images and extract it as it is. The proposed
approach used fast string matching and sorting algorithms to develop the
proposed solution. The experimental results showed very promising accu-
1.5 Thesis Main Contributions 28
rate results for this new security problem which encouraged us to take the
solution to the next level and consider detecting and extracting the encrypted
hidden URL in the images.
2. The main contribution in the “Fingerprint Recognition Techniques” chapter
is developing a new approximate pattern matching based approach for fast
and accurate recognition of fingerprints, and solving the rotation problem
through making use of the approximate circular string matching algorithms.
The proposed solution is a first attempt to address the issue of fingerprint
recognition systems through using circular string matching algorithms and
proposing a solution based on the comparison of the circular binary string
representation of fingerprints. The experiment results showed that the false
match rate (FMR) and the false non-match rate (FNMR) mean values for the
proposed solution match and sometimes outperform the current solutions
and give more accurate results in high speed of average time 4.5 seconds,
regardless of the rotation degree of the scanned fingerprint. Furthermore,
detecting the fingerprint information is usually done through storing the
information about ridge endings and bifurcations as sets of coordinates.
However, the algorithm in the proposed solution will extract and store the
ridge and furrow information in the form of circular strings, and that is the
novelty of the solution. This will help in solving the rotation problem while
keeping the high speed and accuracy of the detection process.
3. The smart meter analysis problem is a relatively new problem in security
and privacy concerns, the contribution of this chapter is through proposing
an algorithmic approach in terms of some probabilistic conditions to detect
private in-house activities. However, in order to achieve the desired level
of efficiency, the approach combined the use of fast sorting, searching and
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matching algorithms in a way that through the analysis of time and space
complexity for the overall approach proved that the proposed algorithmic
approach will achieve a very promising result in development.
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This dissertation is divided into six chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 - Introduction:
This chapter, attempted to introduce the two major fields of interest for this thesis,
namely information security, and bioinformatics, from an algorithmic perspective.
Chapter 2 - Notions and Definitions:
Provides the basic notions required to properly follow the work and results pre-
sented in the subsequent chapters; in particular, it introduces the basic definitions
and notations on alphabet and strings, string similarity, notations and also describes
some elementary data structures and related techniques.
Chapter 3 - Malware Detection Techniques:
The first section of the third chapter describes the malware detection problem by
presenting the existing malware evasion techniques along with the latest related
work in malware detection. We propose a dynamic computer malware detection
model, using a biology tool, that can detect malwares to prevent attacks which
might cause damaging or stealing sensitive information. Then, we present the
results of implementing the proposed model.
In the second section of this chapter, we define the concept of steganography
and its applications and briefly review some of the current image steganography
techniques which is the focus of this section. Next, we introduce an algorithm
for detecting malware URLs or (any kind) of URLs in image steganography with
full analysis of the time and space complexity for each step and then we take the
solution to the next level to consider detecting and extracting encrypted URLs.
Finally, briefly concluding the section with some discussion and future proposals.
Chapter 4 - Fingerprint Recognition Using Circular String Pattern Match-
ing Techniques:
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This chapter, studies the performance of the existing Automated Fingerprint Iden-
tification System (AFIS) and then proposes a novel and new pattern matching
based approach for quick and accurate recognition of fingerprints regardless of its
location and rotation on the scan surface. With the help of approximate circular
string matching algorithms. Next, we present the results after implementing the
proposed solution.
Chapter 5 - Smart Meter Data Analysis:
Provides a detailed understanding of the new "Smart Meters" technology and dis-
cusses the strength and weakness behind it. Then, propose an algorithmic approach
for the comparison and analysis of Smart Meter data readings, considering the
time and temperature factors at each second to identify the users patterns at each
house by identifying the appliances activities at each second with a with full time
and space analysis of the proposed algorithm.
Chapter 6 - Concluding Remarks:
Summarises the results of the work presented in the previous chapters, conclusions




2.1 Alphabets and Strings
Strings are the main data type used in this thesis which also can be called words
or sequences. A string is an ordered sequence of characters or symbols taken from
a finite set called alphabet Σ. This definition implies that any file is composed of
finite distinct characters can be treated as a string. For example, all the biological
sequences used throughout the thesis are strings over 4 characters which is the
DNA alphabet {A,C,G,T}, another example, is the binary strings which are over
the alphabet {0,1}.
However, at the beginning of the 21st century the interest of studying strings
similarities and properties has increased dramatically and developed into a respect-
ful computer science field known as Stringology or algorithms on Strings. The
term stringology first used by Zvi Galil in 1984, denotes a science of algorithms
on strings and sequence. Algorithms mainly solves problems like exact and ap-
proximate pattern matching, searching for repetitions in various texts,..etc [124].
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Stringology can be implemented in many areas that utilize its results, for exam-
ple, informations security, information retrieval, computer vision, bioinformatics,
DNA processing,..etc. And it is expected to grow even further due to the increasing
demand for efficient high speed stringology algorithms.
Formally, Let Σ be a finite alphabet which consists of a set of characters (or
symbols). The cardinality of an alphabet is denoted by |Σ|. The set of all non-
empty strings over the alphabet Σ is denoted by Σ+. The empty string is the empty
sequence (of zero length) is denoted by ε; that is Σ∗ = Σ+∪ ε .
For an alphabet Σ, a string is a sequence of zero or more characters (or symbols).
A string x of length n is represented by x[0 · · ·n−1], where x[i] ∈ Σ for 0≤ i≤ n.
The i-th symbol of a string x is denoted by x[i].
Example : x = aabbaba is a non-empty string over Σ= {a,b}. of length |x|= 7.
The string xy is a concatenation of two strings x and y. The concatenation of k
copies of x is denoted by xk and its called the k− th power of x.
Example: The string x = bbbb , is the 4th power of b, denoted for short as x = b4.
A substring of x, can be denoted by x[i · · · j] that starts at position i and ends
at position j. Then a string w is a substring of x if x = uwv, where u,v ∈ Σ∗.
Conversely, x is called a super-string of w.
Example: If x = abbaaba and w = baab then w can be called a 4 substring of x
starts at position 4.
Also, the substring x[1..i] is called a prefix of x,and a proper prefix of x if i< n.
Similarly, the substring x[ j..n] will be called a suffix of x and a proper suffix of x
if j > 1.
Example: If x = abbaaba, then x[1,5] = abbaa is the longest proper prefix of x.
And x[4,7] = aaba is the proper suffix of x.
A repeat in string x is a substring that occurs in x at least two times. Moreover,
the repeat can appear in the string x as discrete, consecutive or as overlapping.
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Example: If x = bababab, then both strings ba and bab are repeats in x.
The substring w of x can be called period of x if x can be written as x = wkw′ ,
where k ≥ 1 and w′ is a prefix of w. The shortest period of x is called the period
of x.
Example: If x = abcabcab, then the substrings abc, abcabc and the string x itself
are all called periods of x but only abc is the period of x.
A cover is the substring w of x such that x can be constructed by concatenations
and superpositions copies of w.
Example: If the string x = ababaaba then the substring aba and x cover x. If x has
a cover w does not equal to x then x is said to be quasi-period; otherwise x is said
to be super-primitive.
A seed is an extended cover in the sense of a cover of a super-string of x.
Example: The string x = bbabab has a proper seed bab, since bab covers a super-
string babbabab of x.
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2.2 Strings Similarity Measurements
The string similarity is originally a bioinformatics’ term which is used to measure
how similar two aligned strings are. However, its also can be used on one string to
measure which parts of the string are alike.
Usually there are two methods to measure the similarities between two strings
or the distances between them as follows:
2.2.1 Distances and Alignment
The Edit Distance defined as the distance δE(x,y) between two strings x and y
as the minimal number of a sequence of operations that transform x into y [47].
The number of a sequence of operations is the sum of the individual operations.
The operations are a finite set of rules of the form δE(x,y) = n, where x and y
are different strings and n is a non-negative real number. Once the sequence of
operations has converted the string x into y, no further operations can be done on y.
The edit distance is symmetrical and, it holds 0≤ δE(x,y)≤ max(|x|, |y|).
• Insertion: δE(ε,a), i.e. inserting the letter a.
• Deletion: δE(a,ε), i.e. deleting the letter a.
• Substitution or Replacement: δE(a,b) for a ̸= b, i.e. substituting a by b.
The Hamming Distance defined as given two strings of equal length, the
hamming distance between them is the number of positions for which the corre-
sponding symbols are different. In other words, the hamming distance between two
strings of equal length is the minimum number of symbol substitutions required to
change one string into the other.
Hamming distance allows only substitutions, which cost 1. also, it is symmetric,
and finite. In this case it holds 0≤ δ (x,y)≤ |y| where |x|= |y|.
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HDist(x,y) = |I|, I = {i|x[i] ̸= y[i],1≤ i≤ n},
where |x|= |y|= n.
Alignment of Two Strings: In general, the alignment between two strings x,y
∈ Σ∗ whose respective lengths are n and m, is a way to visualize their similarities.
Formally, an alignment A between x and y is a string z, such that (Σ∪ ε)× (Σ∪
ε)× (ε,ε). Furthermore, there are two kinds of string alignment, global alignment
where the comparison is done between two complete strings. And, the local
alignment where the comparison is done between substrings of two strings.
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2.3 Searching and Sorting Algorithms
The sorting algorithms is one of the most important operations in computer
science. In fact, sorting is usually used as a pre-step by most programmers before
they start solving any computational problem to improve the running time of the
algorithm. Radix sort for example, considered to be one of the fastest sorting
algorithms that runs in linear time.
To illustrate the Radix sort, if there were n numbers to sort, such that each number
has J digits, and each digit is in the set {1,2, ..k}, then they can be sorted in O(J(n+
k)) time [28] by distributing the numbers into temporary positions according to
the least significant digit, by repeating the grouping process with the next least
significant digit each time the numbers will get closer to their final positions. So,
as a result, the numbers will be sorted after reaching the last digit k.
As mentioned before, most of the algorithms especially searching algorithms
sort the items before preforming any further instructions. For example, if we
consider the binary search which is as well considered to be one of the fastest
algorithms for searching in a sorted array [113].
For instance, searching for the key T , the algorithm will test whether the key T
is in the array A of length n in O(logn) time by comparing T to the middle key
A[n/2] in the sorted array A. If T appears to be less than the middle key then it
will result that the key T ’s position is located in the first sorted half of the array. If
not, then it will be located in the second half of the sorted array. By repeating this
step recursively on the correct half, it will define the exact position of the key T in
a total of O(logn) comparisons.
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2.4 Exact and Approximate string Matching Prob-
lem
String matching problem is one of the main problems in computer science. In
fact, it arises in wide range of applications [47]. The formal definition of exact
pattern matching problem is; given two strings a text t and a pattern p, to determine
whether the text t contains an exact occurrence of the pattern p [126] such that
t = wpy, while considering the speed and efficiency of the searching process.
For example: If p = bab and t = aababxbababx, then p occurs in t starting at
position 3, 7 and 9. Note that two occurrences of p may overlap, as illustrated by
the occurrences of p at locations 7 and 9 [47].
Similarly, an approximate pattern matching problem is an extension of the exact
pattern matching by allowing mismatch or edit distance [29]. It is defined as;
given two strings a text t and a pattern p, determine whether the text t contains an
approximate occurrence of the pattern p as a substring with at most k-differences
[26].
2.4.1 Circular String Matching
A circular string of length n can be viewed as a traditional linear string, which
has the left- and the right-most symbols wrapped around and stuck together in
some way [114]. Under this notion, the same circular string can be seen as
n different linear strings, which would all be considered equivalent. Given a
string x of length n, we denote by xi = x[i..n− 1]x[0..i− 1], 0 < i < n, the i-th
rotation of x and x0 = x. Consider, for instance, the string x = x0 = abababbc; this
string has the following rotations: x1 = bababbca, x2 = ababbcab, x3 = babbcaba,
x4 = abbcabab, x5 = bbcababa, x6 = bcababab, x7 = cabababb.
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Here we consider the problem of finding occurrences of a pattern x of length m
with circular structure in a text t of length n with linear structure. In fact, This is
the problem of circular string matching.
Exact Circular String Matching
The problem of exact circular string matching has been considered in [74], where
an O(n)-time algorithm was presented. The approach presented in [74] consists of
preprocessing x by constructing a suffix automaton of the string xx, by noting that
every rotation of x is a factor of xx.
Then, by feeding t into the automaton, the lengths of the longest factors of xx
occurring in t can be found by the links followed in the automaton in time O(n).
In [41], an average-case optimal algorithm for exact circular string matching was
presented and it was also shown that the average-case lower bound for single string
matching of Ω(n logσ m/m) also holds for circular string matching.
Recently, in [21], the authors presented two fast average-case algorithms based on
word-level parallelism. The first algorithm requires average-case time O(n logσ m/w),
where w is the number of bits in the computer word. The second one is based on a
mixture of word-level parallelism and q-grams.
The authors showed that with the addition of q-grams, and by setting q =
Θ(logσ m), an average-case optimal time of O(n logσ m/m) is achieved.
Approximate Circular String Matching
The approximate circular string matching pattern problem is an extension of the
exact circular string matching by allowing mismatch or edit distance. It will be
defined in details through the approximate circular string matching via Filtering
(ACSMF) algorithm [14] where it will be used in Chapter 4.
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2.5 Fundamental Data Structures
Data structure is the most fundamental and building block concept in computer
science, It’s a key factor behind designing and developing efficient software
systems. Moreover, Creating efficient programs has little to do with “ programming
tricks ” but rather is based on good organization of information and good algorithms
[111]. Therefore, data structure is the science of structuring information to support
efficient processing and to organize data so it can be accessed quickly and usefully.
Choosing the right data structure will help in processing, retrieving data and
extracting information easily. Furthermore, it is important to know that different
kinds of data structures are needed to organize different kind of data ( text, images,
videos, relational data..etc) for different purposes.
Program efficiency will always be the most important aspect in computer
science. No matter how fast and powerful computers are getting or how the
processor’s speed and memory’s size are improving, it will never decrease the
importance of the programme efficiency. In fact, the fast growing of computer
applications will result in producing more data with more complex problems
demanding more computational solutions to store, process and secure this massive
amount of data. Therefore, there will always be a great need to develop efficient
algorithms, and with that comes the need for efficient improved data structures.
2.5.1 Arrays and Linked Lists
An array is the most common data structure that contains a collection mainly of
similar data types. Elements of data are logically stored sequentially (contiguous)
in blocks within the array. Also, the array is entirely allocated as one block in the
memory. Each element in the array gets it own space. And any element can be
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accessed directly using the index (location) of that particular element (as shown in
Figure 2.1).
Fig. 2.1 Array-Basic Data Structure
Thereafter, array is the most efficient data structure for storing and accessing
a sequence of objects in a constant time O(1). Naturally, if the starting address
(base address) is known, then, it will be easy to calculate the addresses of the
other elements. However, the main disadvantage of the array data structure is that
the size of the array is fixed since it has been created, and in the case of an array
overflow a new array should be created as solution to this problem with double the
size and all the elements should then be shifted to the new array with an extra cost
of time and memory.
Similarly, inserting a new element at the beginning of the array is potentially
expensive since it will require shifting all the existing elements over to make room
for the new one. In contrast, adding an element at the end of the array will require
constant time if the space is available. Moreover, another disadvantage of the
array data structure, is the wasted space if the allocated memory for the array was
more than the required space then the remaining memory space will be wasted ( as
shown in Figure 2.2).
2.5 Fundamental Data Structures 42
Fig. 2.2 Wasted Space in Arrays
On the other hand, linked list is also a common data structure for dynamic
list, and uses the memory more efficiently than array. For instance, in the array
overflow case (when the array grows more than it size) to add more elements a new
array will be created (double size of the previous one) even if the extra required
space is only for one element, and that is as result of the fixed arrays size, but in
the linked list, the size is not limited, whereas the blocks are created along each
time a new element is inserted, also there is no unused memory.
However, there is an extra used memory which is used to store the pointers between
the nodes. In fact, the linked list data, is stored in multiple non-contiguous blocks
of memory, each block of memory is called "node", the identity of the linked list is
the pointer to the head node (pointer to the first node), each node have two blocks
one to store the data (the value) the second block to store the pointer (the address
to the next node).
For Example, an integer element will require 4 bytes. So, the node will be a block
of 8 bytes (4 bytes to store the integer and 4 bytes for the pointer to store the
address to the next node) as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Fig. 2.3 Linked List - Data Structure
Thereafter, in an array it is a constant time O(1) to access an element by
knowing the starting address and calculating the addresses of the other elements in
the array. Whereas, in linked list we have to travel from one node to anther to find
and reach the required element in O(n) time as linked list does not allow random
access to the data.
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Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic instruc-
tions used in the development and functioning of all living organisms and viruses;
it contains the biological instructions that make each species unique. In fact, it is
the building block of the life [86]. The DNA was well defined in 1953 by James
Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin.
Furthermore, most of DNA molecules consist of double stranded helix which
contain two long biopolymers made of nucleotides. In other words, DNA molecule
is composed of four types of smaller chemical molecules (nucleotide bases): ade-
nine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T); these four letters {A,C,G,T}
are called DNA alphabet. The order of these four nucleotides within a DNA
molecule bases is called the DNA sequence, and segments of the DNA that carry
genetic information are called genes. However, each base of these four nucleotides
bases bonds with its complementary base to form a base pair. The rules are as
follows:
A always bonds to T ,
C always bonds to G.
Therefore, a single strand of DNA can be presented as a string composed of
the four letters DNA alphabet. Also, if the sequence of one strand of a DNA is
known, then the sequence of the strand that will pair with, or "complement" it can
be predicted (as shown in the Figure 2.4).
Fig. 2.4 Sample genetic code with complementary strands [15].
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DNA sequencing is the process of reading the nucleotide bases and determine
the exact order of these nucleotide bases within a DNA molecule. This sequencing
process was first developed by Frederick Sanger in 1975. In fact, it was named
after him (Sanger Sequencing). The accuracy of this sequencing was high up to
99.9% producing long sequences between 400-900 base pairs.
However, it was mainly a laboratory method [87] which was time consuming in
practice and very expensive [97]. Yet, Sanger Sequencing was the workhorse
technology for DNA sequencing for so many years until it was replaced slowly
with new DNA sequencing technologies that were developed in the mid to late
1990s [10].
Also, in 2006 new technologies were developed to allow rapid sequencing of large
amounts of DNA called next-generation sequencing that are much faster and less
expensive but with lower accuracy 98 - 99.9% and shorter sequences.
One example of these new next-generation sequencing technologies is the technol-
ogy that was developed by Illumina called (Genome Analyser), that generates in a
single experiment millions of very short reads ranging from 25 to 50 bp. However,
the properties that should be considered in any sequencing process are (cost, speed,
amount of data, sequence length and error rate) [94].
Consequently, the new high throughput sequencing technology methods have
redefined the previous sequencing properties and how the genome is sequenced.
By producing tens of millions of short sequences (reads) in a single experiment
with much lower cost than the previous old methods. And due to this massive
amount of the generated data, an efficient algorithms for mapping these short
sequences to a reference genome are in great demand [10]. And as mentioned
in Section 1.2, bioinformatics can be defined as the use of algorithms or more
specifically computers for processing any biologically-derived information such
as DNA sequencing.
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Reads: Are DNA fragments which are the outputs of the DNA sequencer
instrument, after breaking the DNA into fragments. Each nucleotide sequences is
called a “read”. The reads are used later as an inputs to reconstruct the original




The Internet is considered to be a rich platform of information where many people
get benefit from it access but still they are being attacked by computer malware
and various other threats which distract their normal work flow to be carried out in
an efficient manner. New anti-malware technologies are introduced to the world
by the clock, but at the same time new malware techniques have also emerged to
misuse these technologies.
Malware is a generic term used to describe all kinds of malicious software;
viruses, worms, spyware and trojan horses are all examples of malicious software.
It is created by attackers to not only cause major threat to the security and privacy
of computer users and their sensitive information, but most of the time it is also
responsible for a significant amount of financial loss. As the complexity of modern
computing systems is growing, various vulnerabilities are unavoidable in software
systems and online services; this increases the possibility of the malware attack
that usually exploits such vulnerabilities in order to damage the systems [139].
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Taking " Stuxnet " malware as an example, which was a very complex threat
in 2010. This large piece of malware was developed to target Iranian Nuclear
Control Systems in order to take control of the system. Stuxnet is a programmable
logic controller rootkit, which has applied complex instruction injection, anti-virus
avoidance techniques, network infection routines, peer to peer updates, and a
command and control interface [38].
Furthermore, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ published on june 2015
a full analysis of the Stegoloader malware which is a Stealthy Information Stealer
and they explained that the malware authors are evolving their techniques to evade
network and host-based detection mechanisms. Stegoloader could represent an
emerging trend in malware by the use of digital image steganography to hide
malicious code. In fact, "Stegoloader has a modular design and uses digital
steganography to hide its main module’s code inside a Portable Network Graphics
(PNG) image downloaded from a legitimate website" [33].
However, further the increasing number of vulnerabilities as well as the high
number of new malware variants every day will increase the emergency need for
anti-malware systems. This is happening while every day an extensive amount of
new, unique samples of malware are appearing (based on VirusTotal [131] daily
report) Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 using different/new carriers to travel Figure 3.3.
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Fig. 3.1 Statistics of Malware Files by Country (during the last 7 days of last
access 7-2-2016 via www.virustotal.com)
Fig. 3.2 Number of new, unique samples of Malware(during the last 7 days of last
access 7-2-2016 via www.virustotal.com)
Fig. 3.3 Statistics of Malware using Different Types of Files(during the last 7 days
of last access 7-2-2016 via www.virustotal.com)
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3.2 Motivation
Although many studies performed towards malware detection, it is always a
constant race between malicious code writers and anti-malware researchers. In
2014, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated in their
report (Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime Economic impact
of cybercrime) that annual cybercrime cost to the global economy damage is more
than $400 billion [31] adding:
The cost of cybercrime will continue to increase as more business
functions move online and as more companies and consumers around
the world connect to the Internet.
In this chapter, using a biology tool, a dynamic computer malware detection model
has been presented that can detect the malwares to prevent attacks which might
cause damaging or stealing sensitive information. This model is inspired by REAL
[42] which is an efficient read aligner for next generation sequencing for processing
biological data. Experimental results of this study shows that the proposed system
is efficient and it is a novel way for detecting malware code embedded in different
types of computer files, using bioinformatics tools with consistency and accuracy
in detecting the malware and it was able to complete the assignment in high speed
without excessive memory usages.
Furthermore, in this chapter, a novel detection approach has been proposed that
will concentrate on detecting any kind of hidden URL (innocent or malicious) in
most types of images and extract the hidden URL from the carrier image as it is.
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3.3 Malware Detection using Computational Biol-
ogy Tools
3.3.1 Introduction
Considering the daily reports on the huge number of malware variants detected by
different honeypots, anti-malware companies and research labs, it is so difficult to
manually analyse each variant to understand the purpose of the malware authors.
To tackle this problem, malware analysts apply different methodologies which
mainly are grouped into three main categories: static, dynamic and a hybrid
approach which is a combination of the both static and dynamic analysis.
Static analysis of a malware, focus on the structure of the program and provide
a thorough understanding of the malicious software to the analyst without the
need to execute the malware. On the other hand, another group of researchers
apply dynamic analysis to understand the malware behaviour during the running
time. However, in the dynamic analysis the focus of the analyst is on actions
of the malware such as the system calls, the read/ write into memory, and etc.
by observing the malware behaviour. Apart from the time consuming nature of
dynamic analysis, malware authors apply different anti-analysis techniques to
obfuscate the analysis process, such as anti-debugging, anti-virtualisation, anti-
emulation techniques...etc.
Accordingly, there are many approaches for malware detections which can be
classified into two categories. First, is the anomaly-based detection approach which
uses its knowledge to monitor the program’s behaviour to decide the maliciousness
of a program under inspection. Second approach, is the signature-based which
is considered as the most popular one [119], it attempts to model the malicious
behaviour of malware and uses this model in the malware detection [53]. Both
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of the detection approaches can employ one of three different analysis: static,
dynamic, or hybrid. Static approach describes the structure of the malicious code
in the program that is under inspection before execution. Dynamic approach
tries to detect the malicious code during or after the program execution. Hybrid
approach is a combination of both previous approaches as shown in Figure 3.4.
Fig. 3.4 A classification of malware detection techniques
The rest of this section is structured as follows. In subsection 3.3.2, the basic
malware analysis and approaches are presented. In subsection 3.3.3, briefly review
some of the related work on string matching malware detection approach. In
subsection 3.3.4, the basic definitions that are used throughout the section are
presented. We give an overview of REAL is subsection 3.3.5. In subsection 3.3.6,
formally defining the solved problem. Subsection 3.3.7, the experiment and results
are discussed. Finally, briefly concluding the section with some future proposals
in subsection 3.3.8.
3.3 Malware Detection using Computational Biology Tools 53
3.3.2 Background
Malware writers keep improving their obfuscation techniques to make the pro-
grams harder to understand and to evade the malware detectors. Encryption is one
of the malware techniques that are used widely to evade signature-based detectors.
In this technique, an encrypted malware is typically composed of the decryptor
and encryptor.
The decryptor recovers the main body whenever the infected file is running. By
using a different key for each infection, the malware makes the encrypted part
unique, thus hiding its signature [137]. Yet, the main problem of the encryption is
that the decryptor remains constant and in such case detector will be able to detect
the malware based on the descriptor’s code pattern.
However, malware writers always create and develop new techniques in writing
malware scripts or codes in order to make it hard to detect. They have reached a
point where the virus can modify its code and appearance after each infection in
order to avoid the detective and the generic scanning. One of the techniques called
"Polymorphic Malware" is capable of changing its decryptor slightly, to avoid the
problem in the previous technique.
Another more advanced technique is the "Metamorphic Malware". It is considered
as one of the best approaches in using obfuscation techniques. It is basically
evolves its body into new generations, which changes the total look of the malware
while keeping the same functionality. It should be able to recognize, parse and
mutate its own body whenever it propagates. It is important that the metamorphic
malware never reveals its constant body in memory due to not using encryption
or packing, thus making it so difficult for the anti-malware scanners to detect this
malware [137].
Nevertheless, there are many obfuscation techniques that are specifically used by
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the malware writers in the polymorphic and metamorphic malware approaches for
example (Dead-Code Insertion, Register Reassignment, Subroutine Reordering,
Instruction Substitution, Code Transposition and Code Integration).
However, most of the malware writers use an old version of a malware to create a
new one by reordering the malware instructions. The majority of malwares that
appears today is a simple repacked version of an old malware [92]. Even after
changing or reordering the instructions of the malware they will still share some
behaviours. Different obfuscated versions of the same malware have to share (at
least) the malicious intent, namely the maliciousness of their semantics, even if
they might express it through different syntactic forms. Therefore, addressing
the malware detection problem from a semantic point of view can lead to a more
robust detection system [96] which will help in detecting them since the detectors
are familiar with the old malware code.
Executable packing in malwares is basically the approach of using the executable
packing technique which is popular nowadays among the malware writers to ob-
fuscate malicious code and evade detection by signature-based anti-virus software.
This later technique is the most common one. In general, it is believed that nearly
80% of malware are packed and 50% of existing malware are packed versions of
old malware [83] and that is due to the accessible effortless open-source and com-
mercial executable packers that help these writers to generate an encrypted version
of their malware. Since it has been packed, the signature-based anti-malware will
not detect the malicious code as it will not be able to match the signature with the
packed malware. As soon as the malware is executed it will be decrypted and do
the harm to the computer.
On the other hand, anti-malware providers try their best to follow up with the latest
developments in order to be able to detect and remove these new malwares and
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overcome their threats. For example, there have been universal unpackers that can
help in detecting and extracting encrypted code from packed executables, but these
unpackers are expensive and time consuming as it might take hours or even days
to scan large collections of executables looking for malware infections.
However, [92] has devised a new approach by applying pattern recognition tech-
niques for fast detection of packed executables. The objective behind fast detection
is to efficiently and accurately distinguish between packed and non-packed exe-
cutables, so that only executables detected as packed will be sent to a universal
unpacker, thus saving a significant amount of processing time as descried below in
Figure 3.10.
Fig. 3.5 Classification system produced by [92] to distinguish between packed and
non-packed executables
This work of classification system extracts a number of features from exe-
cutable files in PE format through static analysis, which means that they will be
able to identify the packed executables without the need of running them. Yet, this
technique will only improve the processing time of malware detecting since it will
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save time when it distinguish between packed and non-packed executables, and
then rely on the unpacker and signature based anti-malware software for detecting
malicious code.
Other approach of distinguishing packed from non-packed executables is based
on raw binary data which was introduced by [83]. They only used the raw binary
information to extract features that can effectively distinguish between packed and
unpacked executables without the need of decoding the instructions of the exe-
cutable. Their algorithm can quickly tell which samples are packed or encrypted
[83] and according to that, these packed executables will be sent to the unpacker
to unpack them.
Meanwhile, there are no proposed solutions or algorithms for detecting viruses
and malwares in packed files without unpacking them first. Results prove that
no algorithm can detect packed executables and computer viruses with absolute
precision, detection may still be performed with high accuracy [92].
One of the most popular malware detection techniques is the pattern matching
algorithm. There is a great demand for high speed and scalable pattern match-
ing algorithms that deal will massive size of databases [143], specifically in the
signature-based malware detection approach which we will be adopted and dis-
cussed in this section.
Malware Signature
In the malware scanner database, each malware is unique by its signature like
a fingerprint for humans; a signature is a sequence of bytes that can be used
to identify and detect specific malware by anti-malware scanners [32]. Usually,
it’s a hash value (a number derived from a string of text) and this unique value
indicates the presence of a specific malware (malicious code) and that is what the
anti-malware software is designed to detect [45]. The process of identifying and
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extracting this unique signature is done through malware researchers in security
labs, which first identify and analyse the new malware and then extract and create
the signature to add it to the signatures database of the anti-malware software.
Therefore, the malware signatures database should be in a constant update phase
[106].
The process of malware analysis is a reverse engineering process that will study
every new malware by security researchers to identify the threat from that malware,
through studying the malware code structure to create a signature specifically for it
so the anti-malware scanners can detect that specific malware using that signature.
There are several attributes that will help in creating the malware signature that is
used in the anti-malware database:
1. Signatures can be generated through hashing parts of the malware code,
where then scanners uses the hashing value as the signature to detect that
malware. However, since some of the malwares change their code every
time to evade malware scanners, the regular hashing technique will not work
once the text is changed, therefore, some anti-malware scanners are using
fuzzy hashing which generates signatures that will detect and identify files
even if they were modified [118].
2. The unique parts in the malware can be identified in different forms, and
these parts can help in generating the signature. For example, some malware
will have specific steps to perform and the signature corresponding to that
unique functions is generated accordingly [11]. Alternatively, there would
be a unique text embedded inside the malware, for example, the malware
will need to know if the target host was already infected “otherwise the size
of an infected file could grow without bounds through repeated infection.”
[63]. Therefore, malware typically place a signature (such as a string) at a
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specific location in the file for this purpose [63]. For instance, the summer
of 2001 saw the CodeRed worm which caused possibly billions in damage.
The worm ran entirely in memory with no traces of its existence in storage.
It worked by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability of Microsoft IIS’s
indexing tool. However, The CodeRed signature below, happen to appears
in access logs:
Fig. 3.6 The CodeRed signature
Or sometimes unique text can be found embedded in the malware such as
names of malware authors, special pop-up messages, infected IP address,
quotes . . . etc [45] since malawre authors main purpose sometime is to grab
attentions. Another example, is the Alureon, or TDSS, which was a trojan
used to intercept network traffic, and obtain sensitive user information. In
2010, it held second place as the most active botnet. Though it originally
appeared in 2007, it evolved enough by 2010 to get noticed. Authorities
arrested its authors (Russian and Estonian nationals) by 2011. Its designers
attempted to evade analysis through obfuscating and encrypting the rootkit
body. Interestingly, they also quoted Hamlet in the malware structure.
Examine a file fragment containing a Hamlet quote below (Figure 3.7):
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Fig. 3.7 Hamlet words embedded in the malwre code
3. In some cases, the same signature can detect more than one malware since
many malwares uses the same code of a previous once or only slightly modify
it. They may also preform similar steps as another malware, or generate the
malware with the help of virus generation kits and that increases the chances
of detecting new malwares (zero-day-malware), since the malware will end
up matching a previous malware signature in the anti-malware database [11].
For example, about 27 variants of the virus W32/Bagle have been structured
and produced from the original malware code [39].
4. Generic signatures is the wider definition of a malware signature, where
security researchers try to identify whole families of malwares instead of one
specific malware, e.g. by designing a signature for a code segment shared
by multiple pieces of malware [24].
5. According to the CA lab security research report “Every day thousands
of new malware variants emerge that rely on common types of previously
classified malicious code” [102].
6. Keeping in mind, “The security researches have to choose and create the
malware signatures carefully, so that they are not found in innocent files by
coincidence" [11].
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Finally, the signature-based detection technique is the most reliable and widely
used technique over the heuristic detection technique and the behavioral detection
technique [24]. The latter two will either examine the malware code after running
it or examine the malware behavior also after running the malware. Whereas, the
signature based detecting technique will detect the malware using the malware
signature before running the malware, and since these signatures are mostly unique,
the false-positives are usually rare [24]. However, the challenge in this technique is
that is it a time consuming process to extract the malware signature manually on a
daily basis. According to the security company “Symantec” Research, traditionally,
the malware signatures are created manually, which is slow. Therefore, creating
efficient malware signatures has become a major challenge for anti-malware com-
panies where they have to handle the time consuming process and the exponential
growth of unique malware signatures databases.
Additionally, some signature-based malware scanners use the “Wildcards”
technique in detecting the malware signature and some uses the “Mismatches”
technique which is adopted in the proposed solution [11] as the scope of the
solution will be dealing with the signatures after they are saved in the anti-malware
database, as will be explained in the next sections.
3.3.3 Related Work
Nowadays, the number of virus signatures and the network bandwidth are growing
significantly and constantly, thus anti-malware vendors have to work very hard to
develop solutions and algorithms that are able to deal with these growing threats.
However, researchers have produced a number of solutions to deal with this prob-
lem specifically in the pattern matching technique. Thus many pattern matching
algorithms have been proposed to solve the problem of intrusion detection system
(IDS) [143].
3.3 Malware Detection using Computational Biology Tools 61
The majority of these algorithms are "Shift based" which are fundamentally relying
on the classic single pattern matching algorithm Boyer-Moore algorithm (BM).
The core idea of (BM) is to utilize information from the pattern itself to quickly
shift the text during searching to reduce number of compares as many as possible.
(BM) introduces a bad character heuristic to effectively capture such information
[17].
For example, "Clam-AV" is one of the anti-virus pattern matching solutions
which has been used widely in UNIX platforms lately [25]. It has been imple-
mented in an extended version of BM (BMEXT) as a core pattern matching
algorithm for scanning basic signatures along with other algorithms AC [2]. The
down side of this algorithm is that its performance will decrease whenever the
number of signatures increases. Another anti-virus pattern matching solution
known as (MRSI: A Fast Pattern Matching Algorithm for Anti-virus Applications)
introduced in [143] is used to improve the previous solution, after analysing the
different types of signatures (Basic, MD5, Regular Expression) and few other
signatures types [ as shown in Table 3.1].
Table 3.1 Different types of signatures that has been analysed by MRSI
And after studying the time processing for each signature type, [143] decided
to concentrate their work on matching the (basic) signatures since it is the most
popular one and the most time consuming in order to improve the virus scanning
speed on Clam-AV. (results in Table 3.2) therefore, they managed to achieve an
80% 100% faster virus scanning speed.
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Table 3.2 The processing time for each signature in Clam-AV
In this section we will study the similarities between the malware detection
problem and the biological molecules sequencing providing the possibilities of
using short reads aligning algorithm REAL in the malware signatures-based detec-
tion problem.
Currently, human genome sequence mapping has been completed. Typical ap-
plications of bioinformatics are: searching one or a set of gene occurrence in a
gene sequence, to compare similarity relationship; or matching unknown protein
sequence according to known protein sample. As the protein and gene could be
represented as sets of strings, traditional pattern matching technology could be
used to solve such matching problems in the malware detection area [37].
3.3.4 Algorithm Preliminaries
Let Σ be a finite alphabet which consists of a set of characters (or symbols). The
cardinality of an alphabet, denoted by |Σ|. The set of all non-empty strings over
the alphabet Σ is denoted by Σ+. The empty string is the empty sequence (of zero
length) and is denoted by ε; we write Σ∗ = Σ+∪ ε . A string is a sequence of zero
or more characters (or symbols) in an alphabet Σ.
The rest of the algorithm preliminaries were defined clearly in Chapter 2.
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3.3.5 Real Overview
REAL is a read aligner, which addresses the problem of efficiently mapping the
reads (reads are defined in chapter 2) p1, p2, ...pr to a reference genome t with at
most k-mismatches. In order for the procedure to be efficient, they made use of
word-level parallelism by transforming each factor of length ℓ of t into a signature
(as shown, in table 3.4) by transferring the reads to its binary equivalent and then
computing the decimal value.
In addition, the idea of using the pigeonhole principle to split each read into ν
fragments is adopted. The general idea for the k-mismatches problem is that inside
any match of the pattern of length m, with at most k errors, there must be at least
m− k letters belonging to the pattern [42]. Therefore, by fragmenting the pattern
into number of fragments it will then require ν− k of the fragments (instead of all
of them) to be perfectly matched on t, the non-candidates can be filtered out very
quickly.
For example, if we split the pattern into 4 fragments and the number of allowed
mismatch is 2,
Then at least (4−2) = 2 fragments will perfectly match with the text, since
the two mismatches can exist in at most two of the fragments (at the same time) as
shown in the image next in Figure 3.8.
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Fig. 3.8 Example where the mismatch can exist in the fragments
By trying the six combinations of the two possible fragments as the seed,
it can catch all hits with two mismatches, for example (if the fragments 1 and
2 matches exactly, the the remaining fragments 3 and 4 will have the possible
allowed mismatches) as shown in the figure next (The possible six combinations,
Figure 3.9).
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Fig. 3.9 (The possible six combinations
Therefore, by combining the word-level parallelism technique to create frag-
ment signatures and then create lists for these signatures depending on the pi-
geonhole principle to help in filtering out the none candidates fragments, and then
sorting these lists according to the signature value will help in performing binary
search to find exiting values which will mean the pattern occurs in the text with
the most k-mismatch allowed. an outline of the REAL algorithm will be explained
next.
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An outline of the REAL algorithm is as follows:
Step 1.
The firs step is to partition the text (the reference genome) t into a set of substrings
(factors) z1,z2..znℓ+1 where zi = t[i...i+ ℓ− 1], for all 1 6 i 6 ℓ+ 1 , and then
compute the signature for each factor σ (zi) by transforming the factor to its binary






Table 3.3 Binary Encoding of DNA Alphabet
And then storing its decimal value as shown below in Table 3.4 in a list the
positions.
Sting x A G C A T
Binary Form 00 10 01 00 11
Signature σ 147
Table 3.4 Signature of String x= AGCTA [10]
And then fragment the factors to compute the signature for each fragment and
store them in lists.
Step 2.
The second step is to sort the signatures list using radix-sort algorithm ( defined in
Chapter 2).
Step 3.
The third step is to compute the fragments and signatures for the patterns (reads)
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and then perform the binary search operation to return wither the patten occurs in
t, if the exact signature occurs then the matching can be extended to the remaining
fragments to match with at most k-mismatches.
REAL algorithm has been presented recently to the gene and DNA sequencing
area and so far it performed very well with positive results. It is worthy of trying
to use this pattern matching algorithm in signature-based pattern matching for
anti-malware and malware detection area.
Full details on how the REAL algorithm work can be found in [42].
3.3.6 Problem Definition
This work considers two areas, signature-based malware detection and bioinfor-
matics sequencing pattern matching. REAL algorithm could solve the problem
described as:
The problem of mapping tens of millions of short sequences to a reference genome
as follows:
Find whether the pattern ρi = ρi[1...ℓ], for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, with ρi ∈ ∑∗, ∑ =
{A,C,G,T}, occurs with at most k-mismatches in t = t[1..n], with t ∈ ∑∗
In particular, we are interested in reporting a pattern, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, in a
case that occurs with the least possible number of allowed mismatches, exactly
once in t [42],[10].
The malware detection problem is defined as follows:
Problem 1. Given a set of patterns {ρ1,ρ2, ...,ρr} of length ℓ, with ρi ∈∑∗, ∑ is a
bounded alphabet, and an integer threshold h> 0, find whether ρi, for all 16 i6 r,
occurs in text t of length n and/or in text tˆ, where t, tˆ ∈ ∑∗ and δE(t, tˆ)6 h.
3.3 Malware Detection using Computational Biology Tools 68
Similarity between two problems:
Both Problems are dealing with massive amounts of data that need to be processed
everyday with as minimum space, time and cost as possible. The DNA sequencing
technologies are improving by the clock and producing tens of millions of short
sequences (reads) in a single experiment that needs to be mapped back to reference
sequences. Likewise, according to recent security reports more than 317 million
new pieces of malware were created in 2014 only. That means around 1 million
new threats were released each day that the malware scanners have to cope with
and detect everyday (new malware signatures).
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3.3.7 The Experiment
The experiment was done with different types of files including Portable Executa-
bles (".exe" and ".dll"), email files, Graphics (".jpg" and ".gif"), OLE2 component
(eg: VBA script), normalized Web files ( HTML, PHP, Jave Script) and normalized
ASCII text file.
Generating signatures is out of the problems’ scope, since as mentioned before cre-
ating malwre signatures will require an intensive analysis of the malware structure
and code. In fact, the proposed solution is focusing on detecting the malwre using
signatures already saved in the database. However, in order to test the solution two
different types of signatures MD5 hash and body-based signature were generated,
either by using Sigtool, a tool for generating MD5 hash or body-based signature
which is a tool we developed as a signature generator component in Microsoft C#
programming language.
Fig. 3.10 Example of some of the generated infected files
The following steps are for generating the signatures given an infected file
Step 1: For body-based signature we started by loading the infected file content as
byte array to the memory (for larger file we only read small segments of the file
(2KB, 2048 Bytes), the selected segment could be taken arbitrary from any part
of the file. For MD5 hash we added an extra step to the process by passing the
byte array extracted from the file to the MD5 hash generator function. Note that
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different signatures can be created from different parts of the infected file body
by selecting different offsets, (the beginning, middle or the end of the file) finding
informative areas in the file body will improve the detection process.
Step 2: Convert the selected byte array to Hexadecimal signature and write
the output to the virus signature library file
For example to create a body-based signature for the file "program.exe" using
the CALMAV signature tool.
root@localhost : /tmp/$sigtool program.exe> test.hdb (3.1)
To create MD5 hash signature use the "–md5" option of sigtool as follow:
root@localhost : /tmp/$sigtool −−hex−dump
dumpprogram.exe> test.hdb(7.2)
The virus library contains list of the signatures stored one signature per line, as
shown in table 2 .
Table 3.5 The Structure of the Virus library File
The first line in the file contains the total number of signature in the library
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As a first testing stage, the viruses were distributed in one folder with 93
different files, total folder size 207MB, the scanning time was 1 second detecting
all the embedded viruses as shown in the figure below (Figure 3.11).
Fig. 3.11 Detecting the infected files with high accuracy and speed A
Then, the viruses were distributed in a larger folder with 1039 different files,
total folder size 819MB, the scanning time was 11 seconds) as shown in the figure
below (Figure 3.12).
Fig. 3.12 Detecting the infected files with high accuracy and speed B
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Detection Accuracy
The detection accuracy of the proposed solution according to the experiment is
very efficient and promising, in fact, after testing the solution on number and types
of different datasets with different number of allowed mismatches, the solution
was able to detect all the infected files embedded in the datasets with high accuracy,
as shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 The accuracy Experiment Results
Detection Performance Evaluation
The proposed solution was tested against the previous two algorithms that were
mentioned in the related work section 3.3.3, the first algorithm is the BMEXT
which is an extended version of BM which is a fast string searching algorithm
[17], and the second algorithm is the MRSI (Multi-block Recursive Shift Indexing)
algorithm [143], both algorithms were implemented in Clam-AV [25] to evaluate
their performance. The time cost in the scanning stage was recorded then translated
to the scanning speed in Mbps (Megabits per second). Two datasets were used in
the experiment, the first dataset contain randomly generated files of 100 Mbytes
and the second dataset was a several executable files of 80 Mbytes in total.
As shown in Figure 3.13 the REAL detection tool outperform both algorithms
in both datasets.
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Fig. 3.13 The detection performance evaluation
3.3.8 Discussion
We have introduced a novel way for detecting malware code embedded in different
types of computer files, using bioinformatics tool, namely REAL (short read
aligner for next generation sequencing), which uses approximate string matching.
One of the benefits of this approach is that REAL is implemented in such a way that
it does not necessarily load the whole file in memory. Instead, it loads blocks of
the file depending on the physical memory of the individual machine. Concerning
the storage used for indexing, no additional hard disk space is necessary for REAL,
as it does not store an index of the file data. The presented experimental results are
very promising, in terms of efficiency and sensitivity on the detection process.
As it is shown by the results in [Table 3.6], REAL showed a consistency and
accuracy in the detection process and it was able to complete the assignment much
faster, despite not using a stored preprocessed index of the scanned files. REAL
outperform classic pattern matching such as Knuth-Morris-Pratt and Boyer-Moore
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[42].
The proposed future work is to focus on two parts. First of all, using some
heuristic algorithm for optimizing segmentation and selection of the signature
region, utilized very well (e.g. level 8 memories). Hence, designing additional
algorithms to further optimize the memory cost.
Second, provide support for signature based container meta-data by allowing
matching for signatures in files stored inside different container types such as
compressed and encrypted files. In Addition, Future work will focus on studying
the capability of perm-term analysis instead of segmentation, experiments with
different and larger malware collections, and a combination of this technique with
machine learning analysis of malicious code.
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3.4 Detection of URL in Image Steganography
3.4.1 Introduction
The word steganography is derived from the Greek words (stegos) meaning (cover)
and (grafia) meaning (writing) [49]. However, Steganography and Cryptogra-
phy considered to be complementing each other rather than replacing each other.
Cryptography is the art of scrambling messages to make it difficult to understand,
whereas, Steganography is the art of hiding it to make it difficult to find.
Therefore, steganography is an extra layer that will support transferring secret
information in a secure way (secrete communication) whereas, cryptography in
this case is data protection. Besides, when steganography fails and the message
can be detected, it is still of no use as it is encrypted using cryptography techniques
[49].
Moreover, Steganographic techniques started ages ago back to ancient Greece.
Starting by writing text on wax-covered tablets to shaving the head of a messenger
and tattoo a message or image on the messenger’s head. And when the hair grow
back, he will be sent to the receiver where the message will be undetected until the
head is shaved again [61].
Since then, the science of steganography has developed significantly to more
sophisticated techniques far more than their ancient predecessors, allowing a user
to hide large amount of information within image, audio files and even networks.
In fact, in reality the main difference between the modern steganographic tech-
niques and the previous once is only the form of (carrier) for the secret information.
For instance, instead of using human skin and wooden tables they use media files
like images and audio.
Although, within the daily discovery of a message hidden with an existing applica-
tion, a new steganographic applications are being devised. And an old methods are
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given new twists [61]. Therefore, there are so are many types of steganography
methods to hide secret data wither with new carriers, new hiding techniques or
new type of secret data.
3.4.2 Motivation
Steganography is the science of hiding data within data, either for the purpose of
secret communication or leaking sensitive confidential data, or even embedding
malicious code or malicious URL. Many different carrier file formats can be used
to hide this data (network, audio, image.. etc) but the most common steganography
carrier is through embedding secret data within images, as it is considered to be
the best and easiest way to hide all types of files (secret files) within an image
using different formats (another image, text, video, virus ,URL..etc).
To the human eye, the changes in the image appearance with the hidden data can
be imperceptible. In fact, images can be a lot more than what we see with our
eyes. Therefore, many solutions were proposed to help in detecting this hidden
data, with each solution having strong and weak points either by the limitation of
resolving one type of image along with specific hiding technique or most likely
without extracting the hidden data.
The detecting process is called “Steganalysis” and most of the current steganalysis
techniques (if the original image that was used to hide the message was unknown
to them) they can only suspect the presence of a hidden message as it is very
difficult to either detect or extract the hidden data if they don’t have the original
image to compare to.
Recently, hiding URL in images are becoming more popular because embedding
URL in an image instead of the whole secret text will occupy much less space in
the carrier [32] and that will help in hiding it, and prevent the chance of it being
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corrupted by image manipulations. These URLs can belong to malware that will
harm the image’s receiver, or they can also be used for leaking secret information
or spying.
Since hiding URLs in images is a relatively new technique and an open problem in
the security and privacy field, the first part of this section proposes a first attempt
of a novel detection approach that will concentrate on detecting any kind of hidden
URL in most images and extract the hidden URL as it is from the carrier image that
used the LSB least significant bit hiding technique in a very fast and accurate way.
The novelty of this approach is that it can extract the hidden text by depending
only on the hidden technique and the message format.
The second part of this section builds on the previous approach through detecting
hidden and encrypted URL, and extracts the URL as it is, in a very accurate and
fast technique.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. In subsection 3.4.3 and subsec-
tion 3.4.4, the basic steganography concept and applications are presented. In
subsection 3.4.5 and in subsection 3.4.6, defining the image steganography and
briefly review some of the current image steganography techniques which is the
focus of this section. An overview of the steganalysis is in subsection 3.4.7. In
subsection 3.4.8, formally defining the solved problem. Subsection 3.4.9, the URL
detection algorithm overview with full analysis of the time and space complexity
for each step. Then an improvement of the solution is presented in 3.4.10 to
detect and extract encrypted ULR followed by and experiment results in 3.4.11.
Finally, briefly concluding the section with some discussion and future proposals
in subsection 3.4.13.
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3.4.3 The Concept of Steganography
The concept of steganography is to embed data, which is to be hidden, however,
this process will require three files:
First, is the secret message which is the information to be hidden and as mentioned
before with the new steganography techniques almost any kind of data can be
hidden.
Second, is the cover file (carrier) that will hold the hidden information and as well,
almost any kind of files can be used as a carrier.
Finally, is the key file to find the hidden message and extract it from the cover file
(if needed), the result of these three files is a file called (Stego File) as shown in
Figure 3.14.
Fig. 3.14 Stego application Scenario
However, the most common steganography technique is embedding messages
within images as its considered to be the best carrier (Cover File) to hide all types
of files within it. For example, hiding (another image, Virus, URL, text, exe file,
audio..etc) without changing its visible properties [98].
For this reason, many companies are finding it difficult to detect the stego files
specially images even after scanning all their employees out going emails.
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3.4.4 Steganography Applications
Steganography can be used for good intentions in many useful ways for example
to help in transferring secret data, copy rights control of materials and smart IDs
(identity cards) where individuals’ details are embedded in their photographs [20].
Also, it can be used in printed images where the data will be embedded before
printing, and after printing the user can scan the printed image with a smart device
and the embedded information will appear on the device, this can be useful in so
many fields especially exhibitions and as a marketing tool to display the products
information.
Nevertheless, hospitals are using Steganography also to keep their patient’s confi-
dential data such as DNA sequences in a secret safe place where the access to it is
highly restricted unlike other data.
On the other hand, like any other science, cyber-crime is believed to benefit from it
in transferring illegal data or embedding viruses and malicious URLs in carries and
other harmful actions. Therefore, due to the rapid development of steganography
methods and techniques the steganography research area has gained so much
attention during the last decade.
Besides that, nowadays any person without any technical background can do
harmful cyper-crime actions with the support of the cyper-crime ready made so-
phisticated softwares which are available online to everyone with no cost and
easy to use, for example, there are alot of steganography tools for instance, Xiao
Steganography [115] which any user can use to leak his/her company’s confidential
information with basically 3 clicks (selecting the cover image, selecting the secret
file or typing the secret message, and finally clicking on the embedding button)
and the software will do the rest.
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3.4.5 Image Steganography
Using an image as a cover file is considered to be one of the most useful and
cost effective technique [79], all the image steganographic techniques to hide data
based on the structure of the most commonly used images format on the internet
(GIF-graphics interchange format), (JPEG-joint photographic expert group), (PNG-
portable network groups )and (BMP- Bit Map Picture).
The image steganography process contain three files as follows:
• Cover Image: In steganography, the original image that was chosen as a
carrier for the secret data is called a cover image.
• Stego Image: Is the result image of choosing the right cover image and
embedding the secret data inside it.
• Stego Key: The sender should have an algorithm for creating the stego image
to embed the data, and the receiver should have the matching algorithm to
extract the hidden data from that particular stego image and sometimes they
use a key to extract the secret message which is called a stego key.
To Formally Define the Image Steganography Embedding Process:
Let C be the chosen Cover Image, and C′ is the Stego Image, the Stego Key will be
denoted as K (if needed), and the hidden message as M and the hidden technique
will be denoted as (+) then:
C+M+K →C′
as shown in Figure 3.15.
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Fig. 3.15 Image Steganography Embedding process [20]
However, the main challenge in image Steganography is that many image
manipulation techniques might destroy the hidden message on any image, since it
will change the feature of the (stego-image) it might as well change the feature of
the hidden message inside it, such as cropping might crop the hidden message if it
was long and located in one section of the image. Or corrupt the message, where
rotation might give the receiver difficulty in finding the hidden message, filtering
might destroy the hidden message completely and so on.
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3.4.6 Current Image Steganography Techniques
There are some naive implementation of image steganography for example by
feeding windows OS command some code to embed the text file which contain
the secret message into a specific image and produce the stego-Image.
Fig. 3.16 Stegocode
However, when displaying the image structure the message reveals itself and
also will not survive any kind of image manipulation [20].
Steganography embedding techniques can be divided into two groups either
Spatial Domain also known as Image Domain which embed directly the secret
data in the intensity of the image pixels, usually in the least significant bit (LSB) in
the image, or the Transform Domain which is also known as Frequency Domain,
where images are first transformed and then the secret data is embedded in the
image [81]. However, there are more two newly introduced techniques which are
the Adaptive Method and the Vector Quantisation (VQ-based) method.
According to (A Review on current Methods and application of Digital image
Steganography 2015) which presented and studied the major steganography algo-
rithms between the year of 2010 and 2014 stated that the Spatial Domain method
is more popular and mostly used by more number of stego authors in comparison
to the Frequency Domain (as shown in Figure 3.17). Yet, there is a lot of scope
and opportunities to develop more and effective methods for steganography [79].
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Fig. 3.17 Mostly used Steganography Methods
The focus of this section will be on Spatial Domain the most popular technique.
Moreover, in spatial domain, the steganographer modifies the secret data and the
cover image, which involves usually re-encoding the least significance bits (LSBs)
in the carrier image. To the human eye these changes in the image value of the
least significant bits (LSB) are imperceptible [19] the strength of the presented
detection approach is that it will preform on most types of images and will extract
the hidden URL as it is.
Least Significant Bits (LSB) Hiding Technique
Its the steganography technique of embedding data at the least significant bits
(LSB) in the cover image. It is considered to be one of the simplest techniques of
embedding data in a cover image. Yet, it's one of the most difficult techniques to
be beaten. This technique embeds the bits of the secret data directly into the least
significant bit plane of the cover image [20].
The changes will be only made on three bits, on average, only half of the bits
in an image will need to be modified to hide a secret data using the maximal cover
size. In fact, the result of these changes are too small to be recognized by the
human visual system (HVS), so the message is effectively hidden [49].
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This technique will be the focus of the presented detection approach since its
widely used and on all most of images.
3.4.7 Stegaanalysis
Steganalysis is the main step in the steganography detecting technique to discover
the hidden messages. It’s the way of identifying the suspected medium, determine
whether or not they have an embedded data into it, and, if possible, recovering that
data. in other words ’Steganalysis is the science of attacking steganography in a
battle that never ends’ [20].
Steganlysis can be challenging sometimes more than cryptanalysis, to explain, the
steganalyst have first to identify the suspected cover file, then locate the hidden
message where sometimes it can be scattered into more than one place in the cover
file, finally, most likely the secret message will be encrypted as an extra level of
hiding it. Whereas, the cryptanalyst main mission usually will be to decrypt the
encrypted message if the encrypted text was provided.
Stegnalysis can be done according to different attacks:
1. If the steganography attack is known to the steganalyst: the cover file,
the hidden message and the steganography tool (algorithm) are all known
to the steganalyst, then its shouldn't be difficult to locate and identify the
hidden message.
2. Only the original file (before embedding the message) and the cover
file (after embedding the message) are known to steganalyst: then the
mission will be to compare the two files and identify the hidden message
according to the pattern differences that are detected between the two files.
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3. If the secret message only is known to the steganalyst: then the mission
will be looking for a known pattern in all the files, and that might be difficult
to achieve if the hidden technique is unknown to the steganalyst.
4. Only the cover file is known to the steganalyst: similarly to the previous
point it will be challenging to identify the hidden message location since it
may be scattered to more than one place or to understand it, since it might
be encrypted.
However, image processing are usually the main technique used in building
steganalysis programs to study different image manipulations such as translating,
filtering, cropping and rotation. Also by examining the cover image structure for
first order statistics (histograms) or second order statistics (correlations between
pixels, distance, direction). JPEG double compression and the distribution of DCT
(discrete cosine transform) coefficients can give hints on the use of DCT-based
image steganography [20].
The focus of this section will be under a new kind of attacks where the type
of the hidden message is known (URL) and the used technique in hiding it is the
(LSB) the least significant bit is know as well in most types and Images.
URL in Image Steganography
Embedding data in images is not a new technique. However, improving this
method in image steganography is getting better and more sophisticated by the
day, one of these recent improvement is embedding a URL ( Uniform Resource
Locator) in the image least significant bits either to direct the receiver to a web
page that include the secret data. Or the embedded URL can belong to a virus that
will harm the image receiver either by destroying data or stealing data. The main
reason behind embedding URL in an image instead of the whole secret data is that
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the URL will occupied much less space in the carrier [36] and that will help in
hiding it and prevent the chance of being corrupted by the image manipulations
(as shown in Figure 3.18).
Fig. 3.18 URL Stego Embedding Scenario
Regarding viruses, as mentioned before, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat
Unit™ published on june 2015 a full analysis of the (Stegoloader malware) which
is a stealthy information stealer. And they explained
Malware authors are evolving their techniques to evade network and
host-based detection mechanisms. Stegoloader could represent an
emerging trend in malware by the use of digital image steganography
to hide malicious code [33].
In fact, Stegoloader has a modular design and uses digital steganography to
hide its main module’s code inside a Portable Network Graphics (PNG) image
downloaded from a legitimate website [33].
Furthermore, another analysis by the same source Dell SecureWorks on another
malware (Lurk Downloader) whereas, this malware specifically embed a URLs into
an image file by inconspicuously manipulating individual pixels , the explained:
The resulting image contains additional data that is virtually invisible
to an observer. Lurk’s primary purpose is to download and execute
secondary malware payloads [117].
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Hidden URL in an image can be for the good cause of secret communication
but unfortunately most likely that is not the case in the past 2 years since viruses
started using this technique. In fact, hidden URLs now are used by malware
authors to download an extra modular as shown in the previous example where the
Lurk malware adopted the hidden URL in image technique in 2014, specifically
it uses an algorithm that can embed URLs into an image file so the stego image
contains additional data that virtually invisible to the human eye. the malwre then
downloads and execute secondary payloads using the hidden URL [117]. However,
the proposed solution in this section will be able to detect any URL regardless of
it’s intention.
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3.4.8 The Problem
In this section, we are dealing with (URLs) hidden inside images. As described
previously, for example, any malicious code can be embedded using least sig-
nificant bit (LSB) technique. Modifying LSB means modifying the colour by
changing the least significant bits of an image. We have different type of colour
formats such as 8 bits, 24 bits..etc. They have both colour and grey scale.
8 bits colour means that each pixel can have any of 256 (28) colour. The same
calculation is applicable on the 8 bits grey scale or 24 bit colors. So, modifying the
least significant bit in an array of huge combination of colors does not make much
difference in human eye. This makes the use of the least significant bits (LSB)
URL attack very effective and undetectable.
For example: an url http://exampleattack.com has got 24 characters, each
character on this url takes 8 bits in ASCII format, therefore, the URL will require
192 significant bits from an image.
For the simplicity of example, lets see how first character ’h’ of our example
url http://exampleattack.com can be added by using least significant bits of an
image.
The ASCII value for ’h’ is decimal 104 and binary 01101000
Before the least significant bits (LSB) insertion lets assume that 8 consecutive
bytes of an images is below.
10000010 10100110 11110101 10110101
10110011 10010111 10000100 10110001
After inserting ’h’ (01101000) in the least significant bits the result is below.
10000010 10100111 11110101 10110100
10110011 10010110 10000100 10110000
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In this way by using more least significant bit of images we can embed the rest of
the characters of the intended URL.
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3.4.9 URL detection Algorithm
This subsection will present the proposed detection algorithm overview, and
detailed algorithm in pseocode to detect a hidden URL from the least significant
bits of an image, and the detailed complexity analyses are done as well.
Algorithm Overview
• Step 1:
Create a sorted list, DOMAIN[], from the static official top level domain list
web site (as shown part of it in Table 3.7).
• Step 2:
Create an array calleded BITMAP[], from an image taking each bit in array.
• Step 3:
Make a character array called, LSBCHARARRAY[] from an Intermediate
array of LSBARRAY[] by converting each 8 bits to an ASCII character.
• Step 4:
Loop through the LSBCHARARRAY[], find out possible hidden url forming
by http or https, www, domain name and top level domain (TLD).
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Table 3.7 List of Top-Level Domains by the ICANN - for full list please refer to
[52]
AAA AARP ABB ABBOTT ABOGADO
AC ACADEMY ACCENTURE ACCOUNTANT ACCOUNTANTS
ACO ACTIVE ACTOR AD ADS
ADULT AE AEG AERO AF
AFL AG AGENCY AI AIG
AIRFORCE AIRTEL AL ALLFINANZ ALSACE
AM AMICA AMSTERDAM ANALYTICS ANDROID
AO APARTMENTS APP APPLE AQ
AQUARELLE AR ARAMCO ARCHI ARMY
ARPA ARTE AS ASIA ASSOCIATES
AT ATTORNEY AU AUCTION AUDI
AUDIO AUTHOR AUTO AUTOS AW
AX AXA AZ AZURE ..etc
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The Algorithm in Pseudocode
The 4 steps given previously are presented in the appendix of this thesis with detail
pseudocode so that users can convert any programming language easily with little
efforts.
Space and Time Complexity analyses:
Step 1 (Create a sorted list from the static official top level domain):
Space complexity: We have a known List of the Top-Level Domains (TLD) (as
shown in Table 3.7) from [52]. So, in preprocessing stage, we create an indexed
array, DOMIAN[] considering each TLD as a string. Space complexity is linear to
the size of all characters plus the index of each string position in a sorted order.
Also, we create a separate index list with just starting position of TLDs with a
specific character. For example, if .co and .com both starts with c, so if we know
where the ’c’ starts in the whole sorted list, we just can look in the block starts
with ’c’. The overall space complexity for the sorted list is O(m)+O(t)+O(i)
where m is the total number of characters, t is the index on each TLD string which
is limited to the official static list.
Time complexity: This can be the step of computation of preprocessing, so com-
plexity is not a major issue. However, it is possible to build up sorted list by radix
sort [109] where the LSD radix sort operates in O(nk) in all cases, where n is the
number of keys, and k is the average key length.
Step 2 (Create a sorted list from the static official top level domain list):
Space complexity: O(m) where m is the number of bits.
Time complexity: O(n) where n is the number of bits. This means in just a single
iteration the array is built.
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Step 3 (Make a character array by converting each 8 bits to an ASCII char-
acter):
Space complexity: The complexity is O(n) here where n = m/8 and m is the
number of bits in BitMap and only one in each 8 bits are placed in character array
by converting 8 such Least Significant bits into character. So, the complexity here
is sub linear. Although an intermediate LSBARRAY has been introduced in Step 3
for clarity purpose of the flow, it is possible to calculate the LSBCHARARRAY di-
rectly from BITMAP[] array. So LSBARRAY[] is not required in implementation.
Time complexity: This is looping through the BitMap array just once and
producing character array by taking each 8 significant bit together and converting
to ASCII. So, the time complexity is linear here with O(n) where looping n bits
just once produce the result.
Converting to ASCII and character is happened just 1 in 1/64 where 1 byte ( 8
consecutive LSB) comes from 64 bits. This operation produces time complexity
of O(n+n/64) which is linear.
Step 4 (Loop through the array, find out possible hidden url forming by http
or https, www, domain name and top level domain(TLD))
Space complexity: The space complexity holds the linearity here with O(n) where
n is the number of characters in the array.
Time complexity: This is a loop through the characters array. Finding first
3 parts of an URL (http/https and/or www, domaion name) are done in one go
in the single loop. There are nested loops used to find the position and for the
calculation purpose for http, https and www. The actual counter of characters array
is incremented in each go whether it is inner loop or outer loop. The complexity
holds linear for the operations because the whole characters array are traversed just
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once. Looking up the 4th part, Top Level Domain (TLD) requires a short lookup
in a sorted array described in Step 1. For the whole character array, this lookup is
just done to complete the search in a sorted and indexed Top Level Domain array
which we called in step 1 as DOMAIN[]. In a sorted list, the binary search works
as log(n) complexity in worst case where n is the number of items in an array. But
in our case, n is narrowed down by index of each character. So, each block of
searched area is n/m where m is the number characters in the alphabet. So, the
search takes log(n/m) time complexity because we know the starting character to
lookup in DOMAIN[] array. The overall complexity stays linear for step 4.
3.4.10 Next Level Detection (Detecting and Extracting Encrypted
URL)
The previous tool can be considered as one of the first tools to detect the hidden
text in images and extract these hidden messages as it is, therefore, we considered
taking it to the next level and improve the detection algorithm to detect and extract
encrypted URLs.
Assuming that the sender encrypted the URL using the (NOT) encryption
technique (as will be explained next) which will help in encrypting and hiding the
plain text at the least significant bits (LSB) of the image.
The following proposed algorithm is a linear time algorithm so, it terms of
time and space it does not add to any more complexity of the previous algorithm.
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The (NOT) Encryption Technique
This level of text encryption will not be detectable using the previous algorithm,
since it will evade the URL detection through using the binary operation NOT to
encrypt the plain text.
To explain, continuing on the example that was mentioned in the Problem
Definition in section 3.4.8:
The ASCII value for ’h’ is decimal 104 and binary 01101000
Before the least significant bits (LSB) insertion lets assume that 8 consecutive
bytes of an images is below.
10000010 10100110 11110101 10110101
10110011 10010111 10000100 10110001
To add the extra encryption level on the plain text before embedding it in the
image, the ’h’ binary will transform from 01101000 to 10010111
Therefore, after inserting the encrypted ’h’ (10010111) in the least significant
bits the result is below.
10000011 10100110 11110100 10110101
10110010 10010111 10000101 10110001
The strength of this technique that it will encrypt the URL, which is a very short
text embedded in a very large number of pixels, giving the sender the advantage of
hiding the text without any key for the receiver to use to extract the text, in fact,
the receiver will only need to know the hiding technique and the text location to
extract the hidden text.
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3.4.11 Experiments
The solution was implemented using Visual Studio 2015 Studio, ASP.Net 4.5 and
javascript. The solution is available on http://tanvera-001-site2.htempurl.com. it
was tested using bmp, png and gif images of different sizes, colour depth, colour
palletes and compression types. furthermore, the solution has been tested using
IE11, Firefox 4 and Chrome Ver 50.0.
It uses javascript as a client side scripting language and it will work only
on browser where javascript is enabled. It also needs to access files from client
machines or folders, so if there are restrictions on accessing images files, the
browser will not be able to read the images files.
It cannot accept compressed and lossy images as there is a possibility that
the URL data will be lost or corrupted when the images are compressed and the
solution will not be able to extract the URL from the stego image [81]. Further-
more, for monochrome images, changing the least significant bits (LSB) technique
might alter the image in such a way that the changes are visible to the viewers
and raise suspicion that the image have been altered, therefore, it will be eliminated.
Extracting URL Images: The users needs to select the image using the
’Browse’ button, which will open a file selector window. Then, the user will
needs to select an image. Once the image file is selected then the user needs to
click ’Extract URL’ button. The website will then upload the image to the server,
extract the bitmap of the image and apply the algorithm. If it identifies the URL
then it will display the output on the screen as shown in Figure 3.19. However, If a
URL is not present, then an appropriate message is displayed.
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Fig. 3.19 Extracting URL from Image
Hiding URL Images: The user need to select the image where they want to
hide the URL using the ’Browse’ button, which will open a file selector window.
Then, the user needs to select an image. Once the image file is selected then the
URL needs to be entered in the given textbox. After clicking on the ’Hide URL’
button, the system will first verify the URL to make sure that it is a valid URL,
otherwise it will display an error message. The website will then upload the image
to the server, extract the bitmap of the image and hide the URL inside the image.
The modified image will be then displayed on the browser as shown in Figure 3.20.
The user can right click on the image and save the image in a desired location.
Fig. 3.20 Hidding URL using Stego Process
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3.4.12 Checking Experiment Results
Image Difference
We tested the generated images (Stego Images) with the original images (Cover
Images) using a free image comparison website [30]. The website found no
difference between the original and image containing the hidden URL as shown in
Figure 3.21. It compares the pixel value and colour between the images, there is a
threshold (3 points) which the pixel must exceed in order to register as a difference.
And that confirms that the statistics steganalysis techniques will not be effective in
detecting and extracting the hidden encrypted URLs since they are very short and
the changes that they do to the images are imperceptible.
Fig. 3.21 Image Difference between original image and stego image
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Histograms Analysis
We have analyzed the histograms of the image and the generated stego image.
There was no difference between the histograms of both these original image 3.22
and the stego image 3.23. And that again confirm that the steganalysis depending
on the histograms wont detect the hidden URL even if the original image is known
and the Stego image is known as well.
Fig. 3.22 Histograms Analysis
Fig. 3.23 Histograms Analysis
3.4.13 Discussion and Future Work
This section described in details from the existing research how data can be hidden
in an image. Also, have dealt with hidden URL detection in images and explained
the approach as well as providing the proposed algorithm in pseodocode, which
can be implemented in a programming language of any choice with little efforts.
Furthermore, the URL detection problem in images was simplified with respect
to string matching approach which can be used in other kind of string matching
problem in an image. For example, users may be interested to search for malicious
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commands or other kind of strings hidden in the image using least significant bits
(LSB) of the image. However, the proposed solution was taken to the next level
to consider detecting and extracting encrypted hidden URLs. The experiments
showed that the solution is very effective in detecting and extracting the URLs
comparing to the statistical detecting technique which it will not even realised the
differences after embedding the URL and that is due to URL short length.
Detecting and extracting URL as it is, specifically in images is a novel approach
in image Steganography analysis. However, the reason of concentrating on this
problem is a response to the introduction of the new technique of embedding
malicious URLs in images recently, and that is relatively a new technique for
hiding/spreading viruses. The approach time and space complexity are promising,





In Biometrics, fingerprint is still one of the most reliable and used technique to
identify individuals. Recently, the need for automatic person identification has
increased more and more in our daily activities, in general, and in the world of
business and industry specifically.
To this end, the use of biometrics has become ubiquitous [108, 128]. Biometrics
refers to metrics related to human characteristics and traits. Since biometric identi-
fiers are unique to individuals, automatic person identification systems based on
biometrics offer more reliable means of identification than the classical knowledge-
based schemes such as password and personal identification number (PIN) and
token based schemes such as magnetic card, passport and driving license.
Among all the various forms of biometrics including face, hand and finger geome-
try, eye, voice, speech and fingerprint [119], the fingerprint-based identification is
the most reliable and popular personal identification method. Fingerprints offer an
infallible means of personal identification and has been used for person authentica-
tion since long. Possibly, the earliest cataloguing of fingerprints dates back to 1891
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when the fingerprints of criminals were collected in Argentina [85]. Now, it is
used not only by police for law enforcement, but also in commercial applications,
such as access control and financial transactions; and in recent times in mobile
phones and computers.
In terms of applications, there are two kinds of fingerprint recognition systems,
namely, verification and identification. In the former, the input is a query fingerprint
with an identity (ID) and the system verifies whether the ID is consistent with the
fingerprint and then outputs either a positive or a negative answer depending on
the result. On the contrary, in identification, the input is only a query fingerprint
and the system computes a list of fingerprints from the database that resemble
the query fingerprint. Therefore, the output is a short (and possibly empty) list of
fingerprints.
The majority of research in recent times has focused mostly on the fingerprint
authentication, but not on the rotation of fingerprints. The lion share of the state-
of-the-art in the fingerprint literature review assumes that the fingerprint is aligned
in the same direction of the stored fingerprint images. This is an important aspect
of fingerprint matching, which various techniques have ignored, and only very
few, in the literature [1], have considered. As computers and mobile devices adopt
fingerprint recognition as a way to authenticate user, this apparent tension gains
more popularity, becoming an integral research area which must be addressed.
4.1.1 Motivation
The performance of Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) heavily
relies on how efficiently minutiae are extracted. Most, if not all, AFIS compare
minutiae information (such as ridge endings and bifurcation position) in form
of sets of coordinates for verification or identification. Surprisingly, research
on alternative minutiae extraction schemes is scarce. This section, proposes the
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approach and implementation of a novel approach for fingerprint recognition based
on the extraction of minutiae in form of circular strings, which are suitable for
approximate circular string matching. In addition to that, the proposed solution is
able to detect the exact location and rotation of the input fingerprint regardless of
its location on the scan surface.
The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows. In Subsection 4.2.1,
we present some background related to fingerprints. Subsection 4.2.2 presents a
brief literature review. We present our approach in Subsection 4.3.1 after discussing
some preliminaries in Section 4.3. The experiment and the result analysis will be
presented in Section 4.4. Finally, we briefly conclude in Section 4.5.
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4.2 A Novel Pattern Matching Approach for Fingerprint-
Based Authentication
4.2.1 Background
Fingerprint pattern can be simply defined as the combination of ridges and grooves
on the surface of a fingertip. The inside surfaces of the fingers contain minute
ridges of skin with furrows between each ridge. The ridges and furrows run
in parallel lines and curves to each other forming complicated patterns. The
basic fingerprint (FP) patterns are whorl, loop, and arch [99]. However, the most
common and widely used classification method is based on Henry’s classification
[50] [69] which contain 8 classes: Plain Arch, Tented Arch, Left Slant Loop,
Right Slant Loop, Plain Whorl, Double-Loop Whorl Central-Pocket Whorl, and
Accidental Whorl (as shown in Figure 4.1).
Fig. 4.1 Classification of Fingerprint Patterns
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Each fingerprint is highly stable and unique. This uniqueness is determined
by global features like valleys and ridges, and by local features like ridge endings
and ridge bifurcations, which are called minutiae. According to recent studies,
the probability of two individuals having the same fingerprint is less than one in a
billion [107].
Fingerprinting has been used historically to identify individuals using the so-
called ink-technique [77], where the fingers are dabbed with ink to get an imprint
on paper cards which are then scanned to produce the digital image. In this off-line
fingerprint acquisition technique, the fingerprints are matched by using the scanned
images produced above. This method is still very important and popular especially
in the forensics field, where fingerprints are captured from crime scenes. However,
this type of off-line methods are not feasible for biometric systems [44]. The other
approach is to scan and match fingerprints in real time via scanners.
4.2.2 Related works
Fingerprint recognition has been the centre of studies for a long time and as a
result, many algorithms/approaches have been proposed to improve the accuracy
and performance of fingerprint recognition systems. In the fingerprint recognition
literature, a large body of work has been done based on the minutiae of fingerprints
[122, 56, 66, 121]. These works consider various issues including, but not limited
to, compensating for some of the non-linear deformations and real word distortion
in the fingerprint image. As a trade off with accuracy, the issue of memory and
processor intensive computation has also been discussed in some of these works.
The minutiae-based matching are the most popular approach due to the popular
belief that minutiae are the most discriminating and reliable features [62]. Never-
theless, this approach faces some serious challenges related to the large distortions
caused by matching fingerprints with different rotation (as shown in Figure 4.2).
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Fig. 4.2 An example of large distortion from FVC2004 DB1 [135]
As a result, researchers have also used other features for fingerprint matching.
For example, the algorithm in [104] works on a sequence of points in the angle-
curvature domain after transforming the fingerprint images into these points. The
actual matching is performed by computing the least-squares error of the Euclidean
distance between corresponding points of the query fingerprint and the original
stored in the database.
A filter-based algorithm using a bank of Gabor filters to capture both local and
global details in a fingerprint as a compact fixed-length finger code is presented
in [58]. The combinations of different kind of features have also been studied in
the literature [55],[18]. There exist various other works in the literature proposing
different techniques for fingerprint detection based on different feature sets of
fingerprints [57],[43],[66].
Note that, in addition to the large body of scientific literature, a number of
commercial and propitiatory systems are also in existence. In the related industry,
such systems are popularly termed as Automatic Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS). One issue with the AFIS available in the market relates to the sensor used
to capture the fingerprint image.
In particular, the unrealistic assumption of the most biometric systems that the
fingerprint images to be compared are obtained using the same sensor, restricts
their ability to match or compare biometric data originating from different sensors
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[103] (as show in Figure 4.3) .
Fig. 4.3 An example from [103] of the same fingerprint using 2 diffrent AFI
scanners, the number of detected minutiae points in the corresponding images are
39 for image (a) and 14 for image (b)
Another major challenge of commercially available AFISs is to increase the
speed of the matching process without substantially compromising accuracy in the
application context of identification, especially, when the database is large [48].
This is why the quest for even better fingerprint recognition algorithms is still on
particularly in the high-performance computing context [48].
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4.2.3 Contribution
This section, will revisit the fingerprint recognition problem that is the basis of any
fingerprint based identification system. Despite a plethora of fingerprint matching
algorithms there is still room for improvement [48]. Interestingly enough, in
spite of similarities between the two domains, there has not been much work at
the intersection of algorithms on strings and the study of fingerprint recognition.
To the best of our knowledge, here we make a first attempt to employ circular
string matching techniques to solve fingerprint recognition problem efficiently
and accurately. Converting the fingerprint image into string results in a small
string. Matching these strings against other fingerprint images stored as strings
and it can be done in linear time with respect to the total length of the strings. In
this approach, we have formulated an algorithm to detect and verify a fingerprint
regardless of its position and rotation in wide scanning surface area inefficient
way.
4.3 Preliminaries
Let a string x of length n considered as an array x[0..n− 1], where every x[i],
0≤ i< n, is a letter drawn from some fixed alphabet Σ of size σ = |Σ|.
The empty string of length 0 is denoted by ε . A string x is a factor of a string y if
there exist two strings u and v, such that y = uxv.
The rest of the definitions that are used in the overview of the results and the
algorithm were defined clearly in chapter 2.
Furthermore, the circular string matching problem also was clearly defined
in Chapter 2, the exact and the approximate matching, however we will provide
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further explanation to the approximate circular string matching since it will be
used as part of our solution.
Approximate Circular String Matching
The Approximate Circular String Matching via Filtering (ACSMF) algorithm
[14] is used here in order to identify the orientation of the fingerprint. The
basic principle of the algorithm ACSMF is the partitioning scheme that splits the
concatenation of the circular pattern string into 2d+4 fragments, where d is the
maximum edit distance allowed. The Aho-Corasick automaton [2] is then used
to search for the fragments against the text. Once a fragment is identified, the
fragment is extended on both left and right directions to determine a valid match.
In fact, algorithm ACSMF requires average-case time O(n).
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4.3.1 The Approach
This section presents the main contribution, i.e. a novel pattern matching approach
to solve the fingerprint recognition problem. As has been discussed before, there
are two main difficulties related to the fingerprint recognition problem. First, the
lack of a fixed orientation and second, the presence of errors in the scanned image
due to various reasons (e.g. the presence of dust, oil and other impurities on the
finger and on the scanning surface).
In particular, the following issues will be addressed:
First: Placement and orientation of the input fingerprint on the capturing surface
(Rotation Problem).
Second: Consideration of the noises of the input fingerprint, i.e. error tolerant
verification.
Third: Efficiency of identification, i.e. employment of a fast accurate algorithm.
The proposed solution is a first attempt to address the issue of using circular
string matching in fingerprint recognition systems through proposing a solution
based on the comparison of circular string representation of the fingerprint images.
To explain, instead of collecting information about ridge endings and bifurcations
from each fingerprint, the proposed algorithm extracts minutiae information in the
form of circular strings using the proposed extracting algorithm (will be explained
in section 4.3.2). Then, the Approximate Circular String Matching via Filtering
(ACSMF) algorithm [14] is applied to the circular strings, in order to find all
occurrences of the rotations of a pattern of length m in a text of length n, in other
words, to match the extracted circular strings with the string representations of the
fingerprints stored in the database regardless of the different rotation. It follows
that the complexity of this approach is O(n). Therefore, we will be employing a
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two-stage algorithm. We start with a brief overview of the proposed algorithm
below.
Algorithmic Overview
The proposed solution is divided into two main stages, namely the Orientation
Identification stage and the Matching and Verification stage.
Stage 1: Orientation Identification: After extracting the circular strings from
the input fingerprint image using the extracting algorithm (section 4.3.2) the solu-
tion will identify the proper rotation for the input image using the Approximate
Circular String Matching with k-mismatches via filtering (ACSMF) algorithm;
output is the matched input fingerprint correctly reoriented, and formatted accord-
ing to the database standards.
To explain, in the fingerprint scanning process the finger can be placed on the
scanning device at different angles. It could be aligned to the left, right or upside
down (as shown in Figure 4.4).
Fig. 4.4 Different orientation for the same finger print
In fact, the position of the finger can be placed anywhere on the scanning
surface and that is one of the challenging problems in fingerprint recognition
systems. Without identifying the proper orientation, we can not properly compare
it with the fingerprint image in the database and the recognition will not be possible
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nor accurate. Therefore, the task of this stage (Stage 1) is to extract the circular
strings and use them to identify and locate the fingerprint with it correct orientation.
Stage 2: Verification and Matching: This stage will authenticate the input
fingerprint by applying standard string matching techniques to match the input
fingerprint with the fingerprint image stored in the database; output is a yes/no
answer to indicate whether the input image matches the image in the database or
not.
To explain, like all other fingerprint recognition systems a database is maintained
with fingerprint information against which the input fingerprint will be matched.
In the database, we will store a black and white image. Once the orientation of
the input fingerprint has been identified, we can easily reorient the fingerprint
impression and then the matching algorithm runs.
Since fingerprints can contain dust, smudges, etc., the scanned information may
contain errors which means that an exact match with the existing data is highly
unlikely. So, in this stage (Stage 2) we perform an error tolerant matching in an
effort to recognize the input fingerprint against the database of the system.
Stage 1 is in fact where the novel approach takes place. Whereas, Stage 2
makes use of standard techniques for verification, such as edit distance matching.
The first part of Stage 1 (the novel minutiae extraction algorithm) will produce
circular strings for the circular matching operations. This is described in depth
in the next section followed by the description of the (ACSMF) algorithm. Such
an algorithm represents the main contribution of this study, as it replaces the
traditional approach in which fingerprints are compared according to the position
of their ridges and bifurcations.
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4.3.2 Details of Stage 1: Orientation Identification
The goal of this stage is to extract the circular strings in order to find the exact
location and orientation of the input fingerprint in a new and efficient way. In other
words, the result of this stage will be the location of the fingerprint (if there was
a match), and the rotation to be applied in order to re-align the input fingerprint
image according to the matched image in the database.
This first step in this stage, is to extract sets of circular strings at regular
intervals (center points) from the scanned image using the Minutiae Extraction
Algorithm.
The second step in this stage, is that each set of strings is then matched against
the fingerprint image stored in the database using the Approximate Circular String
Matching with k-mismatches via Filtering (ACSMF) algorithm. The best matched
set of circular strings identify the location of the fingerprint which needs to be
re-oriented, by rotating the image around the found center point p.
This stage well help in finding a set of candidate matches on the scan surface
and return the minutiae (in the form of circular strings) of those matches along with
their position on the scanning surface and their best alignment, i.e. the rotation to
apply for re-alignment of the fingerprint. The target is to return as few candidate
matches as possible, so the verification in Stage 2 will only need to perform a few
steps to confirm these match results.
The Minutiae Extraction Algorithm
A preprocessing step is required to enhance the fingerprint image quality to have a
better matching process. To be more specific, the main concept of the minutiae
extraction algorithm in terms of speed and accuracy heavily depends on elimination
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of false minutiae detection [105]. Therefore, a thinning step will help in enhancing
the image quality and reduce the image noise.
For the proposed solution, different thinning techniques have been analysed,
including [116], [130], [134] and [142]. However, the latter has been implemented
in a C++ implementation of the Guo-Hall image thinning algorithm [90] (the
following figure shows an example of the thinning result, Figure 4.5).
Fig. 4.5 Before and after performing the thinning preprocessing step on the finger-
print images
After the preprocessing step, comes the first stage which starts with the Minu-
tiae Extraction Algorithm that uses a novel approach in finding unique combina-
tions of minutiae for fingerprint comparison. Most, if not all, available approaches
traditionally store information about ridge endings and bifurcations as sets of coor-
dinates. The proposed algorithm in this section stores ridge and furrow information
in the form of circular strings and binary strings. The rationale behind this novel
technique is that such an algorithm is fast in practice, and its output is suitable for
circular approximate string matching techniques.
The circular strings are extracted by drawing concentric circles over an input
image, and collecting all pixels at the intersection between each circle and the
fingerprint. Each input image is converted into a 2d matrix of pixels, for example,
a 2d char array; to find the intersection of a circle C with radius r, having center at
(cx, cy) it is sufficient to find all (x, y) coordinates which satisfy the equation of
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the circumference of a circle:
r2 = (x−cx)2+(y˘cy)2. (4.1)
4.3.3 The Algorithm in pseudo-code
1: procedure NOVEL MINUTIAE EXTRACTION
2: Input: "image", a 2d char array representing the scan fingerprint
3: Input: "r", the radius of the current circular scan
4: Input: (cx,cy) the coordinates of the center of the current circular scan
5: Output:"Pattern", a circular binary string
6: for i From cx− r To cx+ r do
7: for j From cy− r To cy+ r do
8: if r2 = (i− x)2+( j− y)2 then
9: pixel image[i][j] is at the intersection of the Fingerprint with
the circle
10: if x<cx then
11: Left half of scan circle
12: if pixel at image[i][j] < 125 then
13: append 0 to the left of pattern (end of the pattern)
14: else
15: append 1 to the left of pattern (end of the pattern)
16: end if
17: else
18: Right half of scan circle
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Algorithm 1 Novel Minutiae Extraction
19: if pixel at img[i][j] < 125 then
20: append 0 to the right of pattern (end of the pattern)
21: else








To explain in detail, the proposed solution will require creating at each center point
a set of circular strings (inner circles) with different radius (as shown in the figure
below, Figure 4.6).
Fig. 4.6 Extracting Set of Circles with Interval Center Points
However, the extraction algorithm will extract only one circular string at a
time, therefore, the algorithm will be repeated S times, where S is the number of
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inner circles for each set (each center point). In fact, the maximum radius is an
input parameter which will then be used to calculate the number of inner circles
for each set (since the minimum radius and the distance between each circle at
the same center point are fixed, so, the number of inner circles can be calculated
accordingly).
Furthermore, the output of this algorithm is one circular binary string extracted
utilizing a circular template having radius r and center point (cx, cy). Note that in
this case the resulting string has alphabet Σ= {0,1}.
To explain the algorithm in detail, line 6 and 7 loop through each pixel of a
square region of 2r by 2r having center at (cx, cy); while the nested loops make it
evident that the Novel Minutiae Extraction algorithm has O(n2) processing time,
this will give the option to search only a specific region where the scan circles are
extracted, instead of searching the whole fingerprint scan. As a result, efficiency
of the algorithm is increased by orders of magnitude. To explain, for an image
of 300x300 pixels, extracting 45 circular strings with radius of 60 pixels takes on
average 0.2200 seconds for interval center points.
Then, the previous equation (equation 4.1) is applied (line 8) in order to find pixels
that belong to the circular string. In other words, all (x, y) coordinates that satisfy
the equation identify pixels that lie on the circumference of radius r.
In lines 10 to 21, the algorithm stores in the output string as 0 whenever the
selected pixel intersects with a ridge, and 1 otherwise (i.e. it intersects with a
furrow). Since the pixels are stored as integers with values between 0 and 255,
in order to know if the pixel intersects with a ridge or a furrow, it is sufficient to
check if this value is greater than 125 (lines 12 and 18).
Afterwards, the final step in the algorithm, is to add an additional condition in
order to avoid scrambling the output string chars. This is because for each iteration
of the inner loop (i.e. for each value of j) one pixel belongs to the left and one to
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the right half of the circle. This is the reason why 0s and 1s are added either at the
left hand side or right hand side of the output string (lines 10 and 16).
Example 1: Let us use fi to denote the image of the input fingerprint. Let
us assume for now that we know the appropriate center point, p of fi. We then
can convert fi to a representation consisting of multiple circular bit streams by
extracting circular segments of the image. This is achieved by constructing s
concentric circles C j of radius r j,1 ≤ j ≤ s, with center at point p [as shown in
Figure 4.7].
For each circle as mentioned previously we obtain minutiae features of the image
by storing 0 wherever the edge of a circle intersects with a ridge and a 1 if it
intersects with a furrow.
Fig. 4.7 Fingerprint with multiple circle scans
So, in this way, for the fingerprint image fi, we get s concentric circles, which
can be transformed into s circular binary strings [as shown in Figure 4.8] with p as
assumed center point.
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Fig. 4.8 Intersection of a circle with the fingerprint
Clearly this procedure can be easily applied on the fingerprint image stored in
the database. In what follows, we will use Y j,1 ≤ j ≤ S to denote the s circular
strings set obtained after applying the above procedure on a fingerprint image
stored in the database. In what follows, we may slightly abuse the notation and
say that Yj corresponds to the circle of radius r j so it can be matched against the
scanned fingerprint with the same radius.
Now, to identify the location and orientation of the input fingerprint we generalize
the above approach to extract the minutiae features and apply the approximate
circular string matching algorithm of [14] as will be described in the next section.
In fact, for the input fingerprint, we cannot assume a particular center point to
draw the concentric circle which is actually the main reason for difficulty in the
process. So instead, we take reference points at regular intervals across rows and
columns of the entire frame of the image (i.e. the input scanning area) and at each
point pℓ, concentric circles C jℓ of radius r j are constructed. Like before, s is the
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number of circles at each reference point pℓ. So from the above procedure, for
each point pℓ we get s circular strings denoted by X jℓ,1≤ j ≤ s.
At this point the problem comes down to identifying the best match across the
set of circles with the same radius. To do this, we make use of the Approximate
Circular String Matching via Filtering (ACSMF) algorithm, presented in [14],
which is accurate and extremely fast in practice, and will be explained in detail in
the next section.
The Approximate Circular String Matching with k-Mismatches via Filtering
Algorithm (ACSMF)
The proposed solution will make use of the (ACSMF) algorithm as a second step
in the first stage. As it is a fast average-case algorithm for approximate circular
string matching with k-mismatches, under the Hamming distance model, requiring
time O(n).
The (ACSMF) algorithm solves the following problem:
Given a pattern x of length m, a text t of length n, and an integer threshold
k < m, find all factors u of t such that u =k xi,06 i< m.
An outline of algorithm ACSMF for solving the previous problem is as follows:
• The first step to apply the (ACSMF) algorithm is to construct the string
x′ = x[0..m−1] x[0...m−2] of length 2m−1.
Fact 1: Any rotation of x is a factor of x′.
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To explain, any rotation of x = x[0..m− 1] is a factor of x′ = x[0..m− 1]
x[0..m−2]; and any factor of length m of x′ is a rotation of x (as shown in
the Figure 4.9 below).
Fig. 4.9 Example of Fact 1
• The pattern x′ is then partitioned in 2k + 4 fragments of length (2m−
1)/(2k+4) and (2m−1)/(2k+4) where k is the number of allowed mis-
matches.
Lemma 1: at least k+1 of the 2k+4 fragments are factors of any rotation
of x.
To explain, if we partition x′ = x[0 · · ·m−1]x[0 · · ·m−2] in 2k+4 fragments
of length (2m− 1)/(2m+ 4) and (2m− 1)/(2m+ 4), at least k+ 1 of the
2k+4 fragments are factors of any factor of length m of x′ (as shown in the
Figure 4.10 below).
Fig. 4.10 Example of Lemma 1 reference ACSMF
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• Then, it matches the 2k + 4 fragments against the text t using an Aho
Corasick automaton for exact matching [2] and constructs a list of tuples
namedL to be the list of size Occ of tuples, where < px′ , ℓ, pt >∈L is a
3-tuple such that 06 px′ < 2m−1 is the position where the fragment occurs
in x
′
, ℓ is the length of the corresponding fragment, and 0 6 pt < n is the
position where the fragment occurs in t.
• Finally, it simply perform letter comparisons and count the number of
mismatches that occurred. The extension to the right side and the left side
of the factor will stop right before the k+1th mismatch, as illustrated in the
figure below (Figure 4.11) and will report a non-match, or stop at the end of
the pattern and will report a match since the allowed number of mismatches
was not exceeded.
Fig. 4.11 Illustration of the final step in ACSMF
To continue the previous example (example 1), we take a particular extracted
circular string X jℓ, and construct X jℓ.X jℓ (to ensure that all conjugates of X jℓ are
considered) and apply algorithm ACSMF on X jℓ.X jℓ and Yj. In other words, we
try to match the circular string Yj (corresponding to the circle of radius r j) to all
circular strings X jℓ (corresponding to the circle of radius r j) generated at each
point pℓ. Thus we can identify the best matched circular string, i.e. the best
matched circles and thereby locate and identify the fingerprint impression with the
correct orientation. Once the orientation has been identified, we can apply standard
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techniques to reorient the image to match with the image from the database in the
next stage.
Approximate circular string matching is a rather undeveloped area. ACSMF
is the best algorithm to be applied in this stage. Full details on how the ACSMF
algorithm work can be found in [95].
4.3.4 Details of Stage 2: Verification and Matching
Once Stage 1 of the algorithm is complete, we can assume that we have two images
of the same size and orientation which we need to match and verify. We call this
a verification process since in (Stage 1) as well we have done a sort of matching
already. However, we need to be certain, and hence we proceed with the current
stage as follows. Each image can now be seen as a two dimensional matrix of
zero/one values, which can be easily converted to a (one dimensional) binary string.
Now, it simply comes down to pattern matching between two strings of the same
length. However, note that, here as well we need to consider possibilities of errors.
So, we simply compute the edit distance between the two binary strings and if the
distance is within the tolerance level, we consider the fingerprint to be recognized.
Otherwise, the authentication fails.
4.4 The Experiment 124
4.4 The Experiment
As opposed to gathering information about ridge endings and bifurcations from
each fingerprint, the proposed algorithm extracts minutiae information in form
of circular strings. Thereafter, the Approximate Circular String Matching via
Filtering (ACSMF) algorithm [95] is applied to the circular strings, to find all
occurrences of the rotations of a pattern of length m in a text of length n [14],
where n is the concatenation of all string representations of the fingerprints in the
database, and m is the string representation of the fingerprint to identify. It follows
that complexity of this approach is O(n). The solution proposed in the previous
section is divided into two main stages:
• Stage 1 – Orientation Identification
• Stage 2 – Verification and Matching
4.4.1 The Implementation
The proposed solution has been developed in ANSI C/C++ using the external
library OpenCV (freely available for academic use, under the BSD licensed, at
(http://opencv.org) for standard image processing.
Different inputs have been tested by running the function fp_auth several times
against the Fingerprint Special Database of the National Institute of Standards
(NIST) [89] which is a database containing fingerprint images scanned from the
same scanner.
"The NIST database of fingerprint images contains 2000 8-bit gray scale
fingerprint image pairs. Each image is 512-by-512 pixels with 32 rows of white
space at the bottom and classified using one of the five following classes: A=Arch,
L=Left Loop, R=Right Loop, T=Tented Arch, W=Whorl." (NIST) [89]
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All external sources are open/free for academic purposes under (BSD licence).
The experiment has been tested with black and white Tiff images. These images
have been preprocessed to be thinned fingerprints using a C++ implementation
of the Guo-Hall image thinning algorithm [90]. The experiment results shows
over-enhanced images with different parameters for the maximum radius.
The steps that the proposed solution will preform in order to compare an input
fingerprint against another fingerprint stored in the database are the following:
• It will start by loading two enhanced (thinned) fingerprint images in two 2d
arrays of pixels. The first image is the input fingerprint from the scanner to
be verified, the second one is the fingerprint stored in the database (assuming
both images uses same scanner standards).
• Then it will extract 1..n circular binary string set and each set contains
s inner circular strings as a representation of both fingerprints taken at
regular intervals (center points) from a center (pxn, pyn) using the minutiae
extraction algorithm described in section 4.3.2.
• Store each set of circular strings in a 2d array.
• Then, loop through each row and column of the 2d array; for each set of
strings, apply the Approximate Circular String Matching with k-mismatches
via filtering (ACSMF) algorithm to a corresponding set of circular strings in
the database, using a specific tolerance threshold (the allowed k mismatch),
under which the input fingerprint is to be considered as a candidate match;
discard all non-matching circular scans.
• Then, the second stage of the solution will be to confirm and verify that this
is the best match and rotation. The proposed solution will uses a simple
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Levenshtein distance implementation in order to return the best alignment of
that candidate match and if the results equal or below the allowed distance
then the matching was successfully done. Figure 4.12 is the call graph of
the proposed solution.
Fig. 4.12 Call graph of the proposed solution.
The following experiment results (in Table 4.1) shows over-enhanced images
with different parameters for the maximum radius.
Table 4.1 Experiment Results
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The data entries in the table are explained as follows:
Mated image: Refers to the input image whether it is related to the compared
image or not.
No. of mismatch allowed: This is the tolerance threshold under which the input
fingerprint is to be considered as candidate match corresponding to the set of
circular strings.
Max radius: The radius for the maximum circle in pixels that can be scanned per
image.
Radius distance: The interval size in pixels between each center point in the
scanned image.
Elapsed time to get scans: The time in seconds to get the total circular scans per
image according to the maximum radius and radius distance (the interval distance
between the center points of circles).
No. matches: The number of candidate matches after applying the (ACSMF)
algorithm for the circles with maximum radius.
Finally, Rotation in pixels is the rotation to be applied on the input fingerprint
image in pixels.
In particular, the table shows that the time to get scans for each image is less
than a second. To explain, since the exact center point for the scanned image is
unknown, the process of getting the scans or extracting the strings, will be through
considering multiple center points according to the (radius distance) parameter
starting from the bottom left of the scanned image and moving on (as explained
previously in the extraction section). The higher radius distance will result in
extracting less circular strings in less time.
Essentially, it shows that the increasing number of allowed mismatches, will
result in increasing the number of matched candidates returned by (ACSMF). For
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instance, when mated images are scanned and compared when the number of
allowed mismatch is very low, almost equal to 10, it returns a negative result.
In contrast, when the number of mismatches allowed is very high, for example 80,
the number of returned matches is 2 even though the input image is different to the
stored image.
However, the correct match is shown when the number of mismatches is equal
to or around 30. Keeping in mind, extending the string length through having
a bigger radius with the same number of allowed mismatches will result in the
chance of decreasing the accuracy of the results, therefore, will have more results
and more matches (for example the circular string with radius 50 will give more
accurate and less number of matches than a circular string with radius 60 with
the same number of allowed mismatches 30). However, having a small radius or
bigger one will mean extracting circular strings from different positions in the
scanned image with different length. Yet, the maximum radius size will have a
great effect on the results in deciding the number of inner circles as it will be
explained in the next section.
In general, the previous results are for extracting the maximum radius and match-
ing it with the maximum radius of the stored image in the database. These results
shows clearly the effect of choosing the number of mismatches allowed, which
should not be very high to avoid false positive returns, nor very low to prevent the
false negative rate.
The main advantage of this approach is regardless of the fingerprint rotation
degree, the accuracy of the result will not be affected, whereas most of the other
fingerprint detection algorithms accuracy results are affected by the rotation degree.
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the rotation problem is still an open problem
and requires a lot of improvements "In the fingerprint there is a need of a fast and
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accurate method which can withstand the challenges like rotation" [65].
Moreover, according to the Fingerprint Matching and Non-Matching Analysis
for Different Tolerance Rotation Degrees study in [93] where they evaluated three
biometric systems (Neurotechnology Verifinger 6.0 Extended, Innovatrics IDKit
SDK and Griaule Fingerprint SDK 2007) and the influence of the fingerprint rota-
tion degrees on false match rate (FMR) and on the false non-match rate (FNMR),
their results showed that these values are affected by the rotation degree as the
(FMR) values increase as rotation degrees increase too. Additionally, it was stated
that one of the factors that affect the performance of the matching algorithm is the
fingerprint rotation.
For example, the result table (table 4.13) from [93] shows the affect of the
rotation degree on the (FMR) value using the biometric system (Innovatrics IDKit
SDK) with overall (FMR) value of mean over 30%.
Fig. 4.13 FMR mean of IDKit SDK in [93]
However, this is not the case in the proposed solution, as shown in the results
next table (Table 4.2) extracting two images (with two inner circular strings) and
matching them with different rotation degree, the extracting time and matching
time was not affected with the rotation degree nor the accuracy of the results.
4.4 The Experiment 130
Table 4.2 Scanning and Matching same Fingerprint with different rotation with
extracting 2 inner circles
Image Name Rotation Degree Scanning Time Matching Time
Image -1- 90% to the R 0.80 sec 4.15 sec
Image -1- 180% 0.88 sec 4.14
Image -2- 90% to the R 0.89 2.56
Image -2- 90% to the L 0.88 2.57
The FMR and FNMR rates are the error rates that define the performance of
biometric systems, so, the final table (table 4.3 ) will compare the false match rate
(FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) mean values for the proposed solution
among the three solutions in in [93] and also among the solution in [65] in regrade
of different rotation degrees.
FMR FNMR
Griaule Fingerprint SDK 2007 0.02 60.46
Innovatrics IDKit SDK 32.00 13
Neurotechnology Verifinger 6.0 8.33 > 7
Khan 2015 6.80 14.20
Proposed Approach 8.60 0.00
Table 4.3 FMR and FNMR of The Proposed Algorithm and other Approaches
It’s clear that the proposed solution will give more accurate results than the
other solutions and faster, in average time 4.5 seconds.
4.4.2 Accuracy and Speed
This approach has two values that determine the accuracy and speed. In Stage 1,
the accuracy depends on the number of concentric circles (inner circles) which was
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denoted by s. The larger the value of s, the higher the accuracy of pinpointing the
location with the correct orientation. However, as s increases the computational
requirement and time also increases as well.
In Stage 1 and 2, there is another value (k-mismatch) which is the tolerance level,
i.e. the edit distance allowed between the two strings. Note that, the bulk of the
computational processing in this approach is required in Stage 1, where we extract
the circular strings, then we apply the (ACSMF) algorithm to identify the best
matched circles. As has been shown in [95], on average, ACSMF works in linear
time to the size of the input and is extremely fast. The size of the circles and
hence the corresponding circular strings are very small and can be assumed to be
constant for all practical purposes.
As a result the running time of Stage 1 would be extremely fast. Again, since
the size of the fingerprint image is very small, any efficient approximate string
matching algorithm in Stage 2 would give us a very quick result.
As shown in table 4.3 the accuracy of the algorithm is high comparing to other
solutions and considering different rotation degrees.
As mentioned previously, the proposed solution concentrated on two challenges
in the fingerprint identifications systems (Image noise and Rotation degree) and
were tested several times against the Fingerprint Special Database of the National
Institute of Standards (NIST) [89].
4.4.3 Cross Matching
Furthermore, the proposed solution also overcomes the challenge that was men-
tioned in the related work (section 4.2.2) which was the restriction on ability to
match nor compare biometric data originating from different sensors or as it called
(Cross matching). Since each sensor detects different numbers of minutiae points
at different positions in the fingerprint images (figure 4.3) which will affect the
4.4 The Experiment 132
accuracy of the matching results since most, if not all, available approaches tradi-
tionally store information about detected minutiae points as sets of coordinates,
and that is not the case in the proposed solution which uses a different approach of
approximate circular string matching.
However, there is another challenge in the (cross-matching) that the proposed
solution will not overcome yet, which is the size of the Region of interest (ROI)
that is to be matched against.
As we assumed all the fingerprint images are within the same size, since we
targeted the systems that use the same scanner to store the fingerprints in the
database and to capture the input fingerprint image, so theses fingerprints from
the same sensors have the same resolution, therefore there is no need to do the
scaling. For example the employees attendees system will capture the employees
fingerprint for the first time and store them in the database, then will match it daily
using the same sensor (overcoming the challenge of the presence of dust, oil and
other impurities on the finger or on the scanning surface and the finger position on
the scanning surface). And that is the scenario in many applications, however, it
will not consider the image size differences, in fact this problem (image size) does
not exist in traditional automatic fingerprint identifications (regular-matching),
rotation and noise are the main two main considerations [101].
However, to target wider applications we have to consider the current situation
where the market is full of Automatic Fingerprint Identification devices and each
device captures the fingerprint image with different sizes. This introduces the
second challenge with the cross matching process (fingerprint image size) to be
considered.
The fingerprint image size or as it called zooming or scaling problem is an
important issue for fingerprints from different capture sensors [138]. The proposed
solution can deal with the fingerprint image captured using any device (sensor)
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as long as the (ROI) is within the same size. In fact, it is still a limitation and
a challenge in most of the fingerprint verification systems, since matching two
fingerprints with two different (ROI) sizes will definitely affect the (FMR) and
(FNMR) rate in a negative way.
However, this challenge is related to the image enhancement preprocessing
stage, where the fingerprint image is firstly enhanced in different ways before
the features contained in it could be detected or extracted [12] and there are
several different image enhancement techniques that are used to improve the image
quality before the matching process [12] such as segmentation, local normalization,
filtering and binarisation/thinning.
Nevertheless, the proposed solution considered one step in the preprocessing
stage for image enhancement which was the image binarisation and thinning
step to improve the fingerprint image before applying the novel pattern matching
proposed solution. However, overcoming the scaling or (ROI) challenge can be
done through adding an extra step to the prepossessing stage for scaling or re-sizing
the fingerprint image and detecting the best (ROI) to enhance the image quality
and therefore, enhance the matching quality.
The fingerprint scaling problem refers to the adjustment of the fingerprint
images to solve the problem of sensor interoperability [100]. Different methods
were introduced to solve the scaling problem for example in [59] where they
improved the interoperability of the fingerprint recognition through using reso-
lution compensation based on sensor evaluation. They directly calculated the
scale parameter as the quotient resolution of two compared sensors which are
known (e.g. scale between URU sensor and UPEK sensor is 700dpi/508dpi) which
means the sensors values will be added manually and the method will be limited
only to the sensors included in the study. Another method [138] developed a
coarse-fine technique to estimate the optimal scale between the input fingerprint
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and the template fingerprints, they calculate the global scale based on the ridge
distance map and determined by the histogram of local refined scale between all
the matchable minutiae pairs. However, this method does not perform equally
on all types of sensors (capacitive, optical, thermal). For example, the accuracy
of scaling between the same kind of sensors, optical sensors (URU vs. UPEK)
outperforms that between different kinds of sensors, optical vs. Capacitive (URU
vs. AES).
After analyzing many scaling methods some of them were limited to the sensors
type and some were limited to the fingerprint detecting methods. And since the
used technique in the proposed solution is a novel new technique using circular
strings, the best suitable scaling method to be used, is through estimating the
average inter-ridge distance of the fingerprint image. To explain, the average inter-
ridge distance is an important characteristic in the fingerprint image enhancement
process [140] and the experimental results in [100] showed that the estimation
method for the scaling parameter is appropriate, and its robustness allows the
typical fingerprint image to be re-scaled accurately. They added, "For the same
finger, average inter-ridge distance is stable correspondingly, so we could calculate
the scaling parameter through making the average inter-ridge distances of two
fingerprint images unified."
Therefore, this can be an extra step in the preprocessing stage to improve the
proposed solution to target wider applications not just in the (regular-matching)
process but in the (cross-matching) process as well.
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4.5 Discussion AND Future Work
This chapter proposes yet a new pattern matching based approach for fast and
accurate recognition of fingerprints. A notable challenge in fingerprint matching is
that the rotation of the fingerprint is assumed to be in sync with the stored image;
in this chapter we have tackled this issue. The novel element of this approach
is the process of using a series of circles to transform minutiae information into
string information consisting of 0s and 1s, and then using the approximate circular
string matching algorithm to identify the orientation. This technique has improved
the performance and accuracy of the fingerprint verification system.
Although the matching algorithm produces nearly accurate results at high speed,
However this approach have only considered the mode where the input is a query
fingerprint with an identity (ID) and the system verifies whether the ID is consistent
with the fingerprint (verification mode). As a future work we can consider the
problem of (identification mode) where the need to match the query fingerprint
against a list of fingerprints in the database and usually its a very big volume of
data with high accuracy and speed similarly to the current approach.
Furthermore, implementing extra processing layers to the database in the current
approach will improve the accuracy and speed for big volume data. For example,
as an improvement for the proposed solution we can make use of the center of
gravity of the fingerprint scan image to use it as the center point p in the image
fi for the constructed circular. An on going experiment is under development to
provide more details.
Chapter 5
Smart Meter Data Analysis
Technique
5.1 Introduction
In response to increasing demands to solve energy problems, the EU has chosen
2020 to be the target of fully implementing its 20-20-20 plan (20% increase in
energy efficiency, 20% reduction of CO2 emissions and 20% renewables). One
way of achieving that goal is revamping the way electricity usage is measured and
communicated through the invention of smart electricity meters [64].
Smart meters are an integral part of a bigger and more complicated system, which,
in addition to smart meters, encompasses communication infrastructure and control
devices [35].
As opposed to the current power grids, smart meter systems have a two-way
communication capability that allows real-time data transfer. These systems are
called Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [64].
Smart meters are currently rolled out in many countries as a plan to cover the need
of conserving energy by reducing the electricity use in houses along with increasing
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users’ energy literacy and improving the user’s consumption behaviours. Since the
smart meters will proved the users with real electricity readings, they will be able
to decide and identify which devices are consuming energy in that specific moment
and how much it will cost. Smart meters read and send electricity consumption
information such as the values of voltage, phase angle and the frequency in real
time to electricity companies [35].
Smart meters are designed with a bidirectional communication capability [as
shown in Figure 5.1, that allows suppliers/electricity companies to send back
consumption data and its corresponding cost to consumers utilizing in-home-
display (IHC) capability [23].
Fig. 5.1 Smart Meters
5.1.1 Motivation
Providing a global understanding of online privacy is crucial, because everything
is connected. Nowadays, companies are providing their customers with more
services that will give them more access to their data and daily activity; electricity
companies are marketing the new smart meters as a new service with great benefit
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to reduce the electricity usage by monitoring the electricity reading in real time.
Although the users might benefit from this extra service, it will compromise the
privacy of the users by giving others constant access to the readings. Since the
smart meters will provide the companies with real electricity readings, they will
be able to decide and identify which devices are consuming energy in that specific
moment and how much it will cost. This kind of information can be exploited by
numerous types of people. Unauthorized use of this information is an invasion of
privacy and may lead to severe consequences.
The advantages of this new technology is clearly defined and introduced to the
clients in a very attractive marking campaigns by the electricity companies, how-
ever, the downside of this technology is not yet exposed to the people clearly,
therefore providing a proof of how analysing the smart meter reading can lead
to identifying exactly the private activates at each house is important, in other
words, these data readings can act like a magnifier at each house, and this can be
considered as a major privacy breach.
This new technology has been recently the focus of many researches who
have been studying the techniques and performance of this technology. This
chapter intends to prove that gaining access to the smart meter readings will give
a clear vision of the exact in house activates through proposing an algorithmic
approach to compare and analyze smart meter data readings, considering the
time and temperature factors at each second to identify the used patterns at each
house by identifying the appliances activities at each second with time complexity
O(log(m)).
The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Smart meters back-
ground is presented in Subsection 5.1.2 and some related privacy issues are pre-
sented in Subsection 5.1.3. In Subsection 5.1.4 some related work to smart meter
data analysis. Subsection 5.1.5 presents the functionally of the new smart meters
5.1 Introduction 139
and how they work. We define the problem in the Section 5.2 and present the
approach in Subsection 5.2.1 with some definitions. The Algorithm description
and complexity analysis will be presented in Subsection 5.3.3. Finally, we briefly
conclude and state the future work in Section 5.4.
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5.1.2 Background
The use of smart meters provides us with a lot of advantages such as eliminate the
need for manual meter reading. Also, providing real time consumption readings,
will help in managing electric loads to prevent outages and blackouts. More accu-
rate bills; avoiding to overpay, underpay, or estimating the bill amount. Promote
efficient consumption by helping consumers to reduce their electricity usage. It
will also, provide the users with the ability to schedule preventive maintenance.
Defining customer segments which will be used for achieving higher returns in
energy programs pricing and also program marketing [67]. Finally, The ability to
detect unwanted or harmful components in current, which helps in rectifying the
problem [35].
On the other hand, like any other newly introduced technology, implementing
smart meters systems bears its risks and challenges, for example, system deploy-
ment and implementation is extremely costly;according to the UK government
(Smart Metering Implementation Program ) report it will cost around £11bn [34].
Also, the lack of the adequate infrastructure would make the process of replacing
the current system to a smart one cumbersome. The method of which smart meters
work present a serious privacy and security issues, the data collected reveals what
appliances the consumers use at their premises, when they use them, their presence
or absence, and their usage habits [35].
5.1.3 Privacy Issues
Breach of privacy has been the number one problem discussed in the media
regarding smart meters. The methodology by which the smart meter system
works is actually what makes it vulnerable and compromises the privacy of its
customers. Any weakness in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) might
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give the privacy hackers the chance to expose customers’ privacy through analysing
electricity consumption information. Having the ability to collect, send, and
analyse electricity usage, it would be possible to detect private in-house activities,
and identify exactly what home appliances were used and when [64].
Each electrical device has its unique method of consuming electricity. Therefore,
analysing consumption data would allow suppliers, and possible hackers, to know
what time customers watched TV, if they used the washing machine, the time they
showered and much more. As opposed to the current metering system that collects
data once a month, smart meters collect data at finer time scales that reveals private
information such as the number of people in a household as well as their sleeping
and eating patterns [16].
Despite its smart capability of data collection and transfer, analysing these data
does not require advanced technology or prior training. In fact, there are numerous
off-the-shelf statistical methods that could decipher the tremendous amounts of
consumption data. These methods can detect several activities in the household
though analysing the level of power consumption, its intermittency, and its duration
[16].
5.1.4 Related Work
Having real time readings or every 5 min, 15 min, or even 30-minutes reading
points will put the electricity supplier companies in a great challenge on how
they are going to manage and deal with the massive data collected from these
smart meters from every house. How they are going to decode these readings
into meaningful information that will help in improving the companies electricity
marketing programs after understating the user consumption behavioural.
Furthermore, data analytic will help them to introduce customized packages to
each customer for energy saving. many data analytic approaches where introduce
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for that purpose trying to transfer the meter reading into meaningful information
that will give an understanding of the user electricity daily usage pattern.
Smart meter data analysis is relatively new concept just like the technology it
self, therefore, the related work to this concept is not much and most of these
approaches tried to provide the users with appliance-specific consumption break
down, focusing on implementing sensors on each appliance in the house as an
identifier for that appliance when receiving the electricity reading.
However, these approaches are costly and not convenient since it requires a sensor
implementation or using smart power outlets on every home appliance. Moreover,
another rule-based approach concentrated on grouping the appliance with sillier
power usage and identifying them according to their frequency of use [78].
In 2012 [132] presented a single sensor approach which tries to link between
smart meters and smart phones (via a gateway) to produce an energy efficiency
services (such as itemized electricity bills or Targeted energy saving advice) but
even with this improvement it is still considered as costly method.
5.1.5 Functionality
By using it bidirectional communication capability, smart meters enable local and
remote execution of control demands such as monitoring home appliances and
devices. In addition, smart meters can communicate with other meters in their
reach, control heat, light, and air conditioning, keep operation schedule for home
appliances and devices, and use data collected to bill consumers accordingly [35].
The two-way communication capability, is beyond just receiving readings from
customer’s meters, but it also goes to sending commands, and get a response back.
For instance, if the electricity provider cute the power off the client due to unpaid
bills, with smart meters systems; it will only take a click to turn the power back on
the client side, whereas, with the classic meters it will take up to days where the
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electricity provider have to arrange for a technician to go to the client’s house to
turn the power on.
Furthermore, since the smart meter will provide a real time electricity readings on
the customer side via the smart meter monitor the electricity provider can access
the reading data every hour which will mean that they will gather 24 reading point
a day, or every 30 minutes which is 48 reading point a day, or every 15 minutes
and get 96 reading points a day and for 5 minuets they will get a 288 reading
points day, and so on, that means the more reading points they can retrieve the
more efficient their data analytic will result.
xi is the reading in kWh at the ith second of the daily reading points X =
[x1,x2...xi..x86,400]














Therefore it is a fact that smart meters will record much more detailed con-
sumption data and have more power than the classic electricity meters can ever
provide.
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5.2 The Problem
In each house, the electricity consumption is influenced by some factors such as
environmental factors (weather, day time, seasons, house size...etc) along with
user’s social behaviour factors and the number of residents in each house which
will definitely effect the electricity consumption.
In this chapter we developed an algorithm to analyse the energy reading in real
time points (every second). Along with some external environmental factors such
as daytime or night-time usage, and outside temperature.
5.2.1 The Approach
The dataset that are used in this approach and later in the experiment is the
(Aggregate Electrical Data) which is part of the Smart* project is to optimize home
energy consumption [127]. The dataset contain the smart meter readings for one
house every second for 4 months. by studying the changes in the power reading
at each second it will be possible to identify almost exact used appliances and
weather it was turned ON or OFF according to the appliances database.
However, if the changes in the power readings (in one second) retrieved more than
one home appliances then we will use the probability approach and identify the
higher probability between the 2 appliances. Even If there was no matches then
we will take the appliances with the higher probability at that second and then the
next higher probability and so on.
The positive change will be considered as (appliances ON) the negative change
as (appliances OFF). If there was an (appliances ON) then it can’t take another
same (appliances ON) again without the OFF action (unless it was specified in
the database), in that case, we consider the highest appliances probability at that
second along with the other factors.
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5.2.2 Definitions
Problem : Smart Meter on Every Second Data
Input : D[1..n] is an array of string which holds data for watt
+ second + temperature in each index of this array.
For example, D[i]=“watt, second, temperature", 1≤ i≤ n
A[1..m] is an array of string which holds data for watt
+ increment + time with percentage of probability
+ temperature with percentage of probability
+ appliance name in each index of this array.
For example, A[ j]=“watt, increment,
time: the percentage of possibility,
temperature: the percentage of possibility,
appliance name", 1≤ j ≤ m
Note 1: The time is divided into 24 units a day, for example:
00:00:00 - 00:59:59; 01:00:00 - 01:59:59; 02:00:00 - 02:59:59;
....; 23:00:00 - 23:59:59;
Note 2: The temperature is divided into 12 units, for example:
under 0; 0-4; 5-9; 10-14; 15-19; 20-24;
25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40-44; 45-49;
and the final unit equal or over 50 centigrade.
Output : O[1..x] is an array of string which holds data for each second
+ open appliances or nothing in each index of this array.
For example, O[y]=“second data, open appliances or nothing"
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5.2.3 Example
Example : Smart Meter on Every Second Data
Input : D[1] = “2500, 00 : 00 : 00, 5”
D[2] = “2500, 00 : 00 : 01, 5”
D[3] = “2740, 00 : 00 : 02, 5”
D[4] = “2740, 00 : 00 : 03, 5”
(First number “2500" means currently watt is 2500 watt)
(Middle number “00 : 00 : 00" means time is 0 o’clock)
(Last number “5" means temperature is 5 Centigrade)
A[1] = “30,10
00 : 00 : 00−0 : 59 : 59 50%,
01 : 00 : 00−01 : 59 : 59 50%,
....





equal or over 50 90%,
Light”
A[2] = “240,20
00 : 00 : 00−00 : 59 : 59 50%,
01 : 00 : 00−01 : 59 : 59 50%,
....





equal or over 50 70%,
Computer”
A[3] = “2500,100
00 : 00 : 00−00 : 59 : 59 70%,
01 : 00 : 00−01 : 59 : 59 70%,
....





equal or over 50 00%,
Heater”
Output : O[1] = “2500, 00 : 00 : 00, 5;Open : Heater"
O[2] = “2500, 00 : 00 : 01, 5;”
O[3] = “2740, 00 : 00 : 02, 5;Open : Computer”
O[4] = “2740, 00 : 00 : 03, 5;”
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5.3 Algorithm
5.3.1 The Algorithm in pseudocode
Algorithm 2 Smart Meter Reading at Every Second Data
1: procedure Smart Meter Reading at Every Second Data
2: for integer w=1 to n on D[1..n] do do
3: newwatt = watt of D[1]
4: end for
5: if w==1 then
6: oldwatt = newwatt
7: end if
8: if (newwatt-oldwatt)>3 then
9: countwatt = countwatt+(newwatt-oldwatt);
10: remembertimes[countremembertimes+1] = w;
11: countremembertimes++;
12: end if
13: if ((newwatt-oldwatt)<-3&&countwatt!=0) then
14: ———find one device———
15: if (highestpoint[countwatt][0]==1) then
16: printf("Time: %d",remembertimes[1]);
17: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
18: printf("Open device name: ");




22: ———find more than one device———
23: if (highestpoint[countwatt][0]>1) then
24: compare[0]=0;
25: for (int s=1; s<=(highestpoint[countwatt][0]); s++) do
26: compare[s]=(newhours[highestpoint [countwatt] [s]]
[int(remembertimes[1]/3600)] + newtemperatures[highestpoint [countwatt]
[s]] [int(AT/5)+1])/2;
27: end for
28: for (int ss=1; ss<=(highestpoint[countwatt][0]); ss++) do




33: for (int sss=1; sss<=(highestpoint[countwatt][0]); sss++) do
34: if (compare[sss]==compare[0]) then
35: printf("Time: %d",remembertimes[1]);
36: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
37: printf("Open device name: ");








44: ——not find device, using greedy algorithm——
45: if (highestpoint[countwatt][0]==0) then
46: int tempremain=countwatt;
47: int tempwatt=countwatt;
48: while (tempremain!=0&&tempwatt!=0) do
49: tempwatt=tempremain;
50: while (highestpoint[tempwatt][0]==0&&(tempwatt!=0)) do
51: tempwatt=tempwatt-1;
52: end while
53: ——–greedy find one device——–
54: if (highestpoint[tempwatt][0]==1) then




59: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
60: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
61: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
62: printf("Open device name: ");





67: if (savenum==1) then





72: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
73: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
74: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
75: printf("Open device name: ");






81: if (savenum>1) then
82: int j=0;
83: for (int i=1; i<=savenum; i++) do








92: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
93: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
94: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
95: printf("Open device name: ");








102: —greedy find more than one device—
103: if (highestpoint[tempwatt][0]>1) then
104: compare[0]=0;
105: for (int s=1; s<=(highestpoint[tempwatt][0]); s++) do
106: compare[s]=(newhours[highestpoint [tempwatt] [s]
[int(remembertimes[1]/3600)] + newtemperatures[highestpoint [tempwatt]
[s]] [int(AT/5)+1])/2;
107: end for
108: for (int ss=1; ss<=(highestpoint[tempwatt][0]); ss++) do




113: for (int sss=1; sss<=(highestpoint[tempwatt][0]); sss++)
do
114: if (compare[sss]==compare[0]) then
115: if (savegreedy[0]==0) then




119: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
120: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
121: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
122: printf("Open device name: ");












132: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
133: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
134: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
135: printf("Open device name: ");






141: if (savenum>1) then
142: int j=0;











152: printf("Increase watt: %d", countwatt);
153: printf("Greedy algorithm find device");
154: printf("Increase watt: %d", tempwatt);
155: printf("Open device name: ");























Create the array D[1..n] of smart meter data for every second. Each record D[i]
consists of three values (watt value, time of the day and the temperature).
Step 2:
According to the input array A[1..m], we create several arrays for appliances
which holds the data for the appliances consumption in watt, time of the day, the
temperature, the of probability percentage of the appliance being switched ON
and the appliance name. For example, the watt array highest point[][] holds the
appearance peak watt, the first index number was indexed by the watt value and
the second is the index position which stores corresponding devices.
Step 3:
Loop through each (second) data in D[1..n]. For each record inside D[1..n], look
for a match appliances data. Either the value in watt can be directly matched
through the appliance array of highest point[][] or there is a possibility of multiple
appliance switched ON at that particular time. Therefore, if it was a direct match
then output the appliance name and time. Otherwise, for no match go to Step 4.
Step 4:
Look for the percentage of probability of each appliance to be switched ON at
that particular time using the temperature factor and resolve this by the greedy
approach whichever matches first based on given probability.
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5.3.3 Algorithm Complexity
Space complexity:
For input array D[1..n] with the every second data, the space complexity is O(n),
where n is the total number of seconds. For input array A[1..m] with appliances,
the space complexity is O(m), where each index of this array holds the data for
watt, increment, time with percentage of portabilities, temperature with percentage
of probability and appliance name, using common separated storage.
Time complexity:
This approach uses binary search in A[1..m] for each index in D[1..n], for 1 iteration
the time complexity is O(log(m)) because both Binary search and probabilistic
approach inside appliance array takes O(log(m)) time. So For n iteration the time
complexity is O(nlog(m)).
5.4 Discussion and Future Work
This chapter described an algorithmic approach in terms of probabilistic conditions
to detect private in-house activities, and identify almost exactly what home appli-
ances were used. We have defined the problem at each second dataset and solved
it in an algorithmic manner. The approach and the complexity are promising, an
on going experiment is under development to provide more details.
As an improvement to the first step in creating the array it can be an array of watt
of applications, WATT[ ][ ], from A[1..m], each index of array means the value
of watt sorted, second index of array stored corresponding application’s code and
that should increase the speed significantly. Also, as a future work the output data
can be trained to predict the exact user daily pattern in general on the long term.
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we introduced novel solutions to overcome the weakness of existing
solutions and solve new open problems in information security.
• The Malware Detection Techniques chapter discusses the malware de-
tection which is a well-known problem introduced to computer security
research a long time ago, but the rapid development of malware requires
more extended solutions since malware writers continually improving their
obfuscation techniques to makes the malicious code harder to understand
and to evade the malware detectors.
Therefore, due to the amount of malware signatures generated daily, an effi-
cient algorithm was introduced for detecting these signatures at high speed
without excessive memory use in that chapter. Nevertheless, improvements
can be made to continue to overcome the compressed malware problem.
The second part of this chapter introduced a novel solution for a relativity
new problem in information security. Recently, malware writers have started
to use image steganography to embed either the whole malicious code or a
malicious URL in the images. A hidden URL detection in an image approach
was introduced and presented in a detailed algorithmic matter in this chapter.
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And then the algorithm was taken to the next level to consider detecting and
extracting encrypted hidden URLs. The approach analysis and experimental
results are very promising since this tool can be consider as one of the first
tools to extract the hidden URL as it is from the image, therefore improving
this algorithm as well as considering variations to detect malicious attacks
by hidden data can be considered as guidelines for future work.
• The Fingerprint Recognition Techniques chapter proposed a new finger-
print matching technique, which matches the fingerprint information through
using algorithms for approximate circular string matching. The minutiae
information is transformed into string information using a series of circles,
which intercepts the minutiae of that information into a string. This string
fingerprint information is then matched against a database using approximate
string matching techniques.
This chapter proposed a novel fingerprint pattern matching approach for
quick and accurate recognition of fingerprints. One overlooked feature in
this approach is that the rotation of the fingerprint is assumed to be in sync
with the stored image; in this chapter we tackled this issue.
Also, the novel element is the process of using a series of circles to transform
minutiae information into string information consisting of 0s and 1s, and
then using the approximate circular string matching algorithm to identify
the orientation. This technique is expected to improve the performance and
accuracy of the fingerprint verification system.
For future work we can consider the problem of identification mode where
there is a need to match the query fingerprint against a list of fingerprints
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in a large database and improve the current solution to cope with a large
volume of data.
• In the Smart Meter Data Analysis Technique chapter a new privacy prob-
lem was introduced to the research area along with the new technology
of a smart metre. This technology will bring a great benefit to electricity
companies and will have an impact on users’ privacy due to constant access
by the electricity companies to home electricity readings in real time.
In this manner, we proposed an algorithmic approach to compare and anal-
yse smart metre data readings, considering time and temperature factors at
each second to identify usage patterns in the house by identifying appliance
activity.
The approach time and space complexity are very promising, and an experi-
ment is under development to provide more details. Also, an improvement
to the implementation of the algorithm was proposed to improve the speed
of the algorithm. Furthermore, as future work we can consider the security
aspect of smart metres by analysing the weakness of the device and the
possibility of hackers having full control of home electricity – just as the
electricity companies do – to control the home electricity through these
devices remotely.
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Appendix
.1 URL Detection Algorithm
.1.1 Detecting and Extracting Hidden URL
1: procedure FindURLInImage
2: CREATE a sorted indexed array DOMAIN[] from the official top level
domain list
3: CREATE a BITMAP[] array from the image taking each bit
4: *Comment: Loop through the BITMAP[] and create an array LSBAR-
RAY[] with the least significant bits
5: Integer i, j
6: i=0
7: j=0
8: for i = 0 to BITMAP[] do
9: if (i != 0) AND (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
10: return LSBARRAY[j++] = BITMAP[i]
11: end if
12: end for
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17: for i = 0 to LSBARRAY[] do t = STRING((t) + LSBARRAY[i])
18: if (i!=0) and (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
19: return LSBCHARARRAY[j++] = ConvertToCharacter(t)
20: t = ""
21: end if
22: end for
23: *Comment: Loop through the LSBCHARARRAY[] to detect URL by
using the DOMAIN[] array Integer temp, l,s






30: String URL = ""
31: String OutPutURLArray[]
32: for i=0 to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
33: ’ Initializeat start of loop
34: httpOrHttpsExists = False
35: wwwExists = False
36: urlFound = False
37: URL = ""
38: J=0
39: t=""
40: temp = 0
41: if LSBCHARARRAY[i] = ":" then
42: *Comment:Check Possibility of having an http:\\
43: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-4] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i+2])
44: if LowerCase(t) = "http:\\" then
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45: httpOrHttpsExists = True
46: temp = i + 3
47: URL= "http:\\"
48: end if
49: t = ""
50: if httpOrHttpsExists = False then
51: *Comment:Possibility of having an https:\\
52: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-5] to LS-
BCHARARRAY[i+2])
53: if LowerCase(t) = "https:
54: " then
55: httpOrHttpsExists = True




60: t = ""
61: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i+3] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i+6])
62: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
63: temp = temp+ i + 5




68: if (httpOrHttpsExists = False Or wwwExists = False) AND LS-
BCHARARRAY[i] = "." then
69: *Comment: Check for . to find www because at this point we
know that http or www trap inside the condition for ":" failed.
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70: t = ""
71: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-3] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i])
72: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
73: *Comment: jump the i to the new position and save in a tem-
morary variable
74: temp = i + 5




79: if httpOrHttpsExists = True Or wwwExists = True then
80: *Comment: Assign the position of i to find the URL
81: i = temp
82: t = ""
83: ’At this point the existence of http of www is found. Now look for
the rest of the url
84: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
85: if LSBCHARARRAY[j] = "." then
86: URL = Concat(URL, ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-
i+1] to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
87: i = j + 1




92: if urlFound then
93: urlFound = False
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Algorithm 3 Procedure FindURLInImage
94: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
95: t = Concat(t,LSBCHARARRAY[j])
96: *Comment: Now check t in sorted top level domain list
DOMAIN
97: if t EXISTS in DOMAIN[] then
98: URL = Concat(URL,
ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-i+1] to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
99: urlFound = True
100: *Comment: Reinitialize the value of i for the next
iteration






107: if urlFound then
108: *Comment: It is possible to have multiple URL in different posi-
tion
109: OutPutURLArray[s] = URL
110: s = s + 1
111: end if
112: end for
113: if s > 0 THEN then
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.1.2 Detecting and Extracting Encrypted URL
1: procedure FindURLInImage
2: CREATE a sorted indexed array DOMAIN[] from the official top level
domain list
3: CREATE a BITMAP[] array from the image taking each bit
4: *Comment: Loop through the BITMAP[] and create an array LSBAR-
RAY[] with the Inverted least significant bits
5: Integer i, j
6: i=0
7: j=0
8: for i = 0 to BITMAP[] do
9: if (i != 0) AND (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
10: return LSBARRAY[j++] = BIT WISE NOT BITMAP[i]
11: end if
12: end for





17: for i = 0 to LSBARRAY[] do t = STRING((t) + LSBARRAY[i])
18: if (i!=0) and (i+1) MOD 8 = 0 then
19: return LSBCHARARRAY[j++] = ConvertToCharacter(t)
20: t = ""
21: end if
22: end for
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23: *Comment: Loop through the LSBCHARARRAY[] to detect URL by
using the DOMAIN[] array Integer temp, l,s






30: String URL = ""
31: String OutPutURLArray[]
32: for i=0 to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
33: ’ Initializeat start of loop
34: httpOrHttpsExists = False
35: wwwExists = False
36: urlFound = False
37: URL = ""
38: J=0
39: t=""
40: temp = 0
41: if LSBCHARARRAY[i] = ":" then
42: *Comment:Check Possibility of having an http:\\
43: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-4] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i+2])
44: if LowerCase(t) = "http:\\" then
45: httpOrHttpsExists = True
46: temp = i + 3
47: URL= "http:\\"
48: end if
.1 URL Detection Algorithm 188
49: t = ""
50: if httpOrHttpsExists = False then
51: *Comment:Possibility of having an https:\\
52: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-5] to LS-
BCHARARRAY[i+2])
53: if LowerCase(t) = "https:
54: " then
55: httpOrHttpsExists = True




60: t = ""
61: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i+3] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i+6])
62: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
63: temp = temp+ i + 5




68: if httpOrHttpsExists = False Or wwwExists = False) AND LS-
BCHARARRAY[i] = "." then
69: *Comment: Check for . to find www because at this point we
know that http or www trap inside the condition for ":" failed.
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70: t = ""
71: t = ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[i-3] to LSBCHARAR-
RAY[i])
72: if LowerCase(t) = "www." then
73: *Comment: jump the i to the new position and save in a tem-
morary variable
74: temp = i + 5




79: if httpOrHttpsExists = True Or wwwExists = True then
80: *Comment: Assign the position of i to find the URL
81: i = temp
82: t = ""
83: ’At his point the existence of http of www is found. Now look for
the rest of the url
84: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
85: if LSBCHARARRAY[j] = "." then
86: URL = Concat(URL, ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-
i+1] to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
87: i = j + 1




92: if urlFound then
93: urlFound = False
94: for j = i to LSBCHARARRAY[] do
95: t = Concat(t,LSBCHARARRAY[j])
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Algorithm 4 Procedure FindURLInImage
96: *Comment: Now check t in sorted top level domain list
DOMAIN
97: if t EXISTS in DOMAIN[] then
98: URL = Concat(URL,
ConvertToString(LSBCHARARRAY[j-i+1] to LSBCHARARRAY[j]))
99: urlFound = True
100: *Comment: Reinitialize the value of i for the next
iteration






107: if urlFound then
108: *Comment: It is possible to have multiple URL in different posi-
tion
109: OutPutURLArray[s] = URL
110: s = s + 1
111: end if
112: end for
113: if s > 0 THEN then





.1 URL Detection Algorithm 191
.1.3 URL Detection code
The first solution is on the following link:
http://tanvera-001-site1.htempurl.com/
u s i n g System ;
u s i n g System . C o l l e c t i o n s . G e n e r i c ;
u s i n g System . Linq ;
u s i n g System . Web ;
u s i n g System . Web . UI ;
u s i n g System . Web . UI . WebControls ;
u s i n g System . IO ;
u s i n g System . Drawing ;
u s i n g S t e g a n o g r a p h y ;
p u b l i c p a r t i a l c l a s s _ D e f a u l t : Page
{
p r i v a t e s t r i n g e x t r a c t e d T e x t = s t r i n g . Empty ;
p r o t e c t e d vo id Page_Load ( o b j e c t s ende r , EventArgs e )
{
}
p r i v a t e boo l I s V a l i d F i l e ( s t r i n g f i l e P a t h )
{
boo l i s V a l i d = f a l s e ;
s t r i n g [ ] f i l e E x t e n s i o n s = { " . bmp " , " . png " , " .BMP" , " . PNG" , " . g i f " , " . GIF " } ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < f i l e E x t e n s i o n s . Length ; i ++)
{
i f ( f i l e P a t h . C o n t a i n s ( f i l e E x t e n s i o n s [ i ] ) )
{
i s V a l i d = t r u e ;
}
}
r e t u r n i s V a l i d ;
}
p r o t e c t e d vo id Ex t rac tURL_Cl i ck ( o b j e c t s ende r , EventArgs e )
{
Bitmap bmp = n u l l ;
E x t r a c t e d T e x t . Text = " " ;
E r r o r T x t . Text = " " ;
Image1 . ImageUrl = " " ;
/ / s t r i n g f u l l P a t h = ImageF i l eUp load . H t t p P o s t e d F i l e . FileName ;
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t r y
{
i f ( ImageF i l eUp l oad . H a s F i l e )
{
i f ( I s V a l i d F i l e ( Conve r t . T o S t r i n g ( ImageF i l eUp load . P o s t e d F i l e . FileName ) ) )
{
s t r i n g d i r U r l = " u p l o a d s " + t h i s . Page . User . I d e n t i t y . Name ;
s t r i n g d i r P a t h = S e r v e r . MapPath ( d i r U r l ) ;
s t r i n g f i l e U r l = d i r U r l + " / " + Pa th . GetFi leName ( I mageF i l eUp load . P o s t e d F i l e . FileName ) ;
i f ( F i l e . E x i s t s ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) )
{
F i l e . D e l e t e ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) ;
}
ImageF i l e Up load . P o s t e d F i l e . SaveAs ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) ;
Image1 . ImageUrl = f i l e U r l ;
u s i n g ( bmp = new Bitmap ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) . T o S t r i n g ( ) ) )
{
s t r i n g e x t r a c t e d T e x t = SteganographyURL . ex t rac tURL ( bmp ) ;
i f ( e x t r a c t e d T e x t . E qu a l s ( " " ) )
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = "No URL Found " ;
}
e l s e
{




e l s e
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " t h i s f i l e t y p e i s n o t s u p p o r t e d " ;
}
}
e l s e
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " S e l e c t a bmp or png or g i f iamge " ;
}
}
c a t c h ( E x c e p t i o n Exc )
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = Exc . Message ;
i f ( bmp != n u l l ) bmp . Di spose ( ) ;
bmp = n u l l ;
}
bmp = n u l l ;
}
p r i v a t e s t a t i c b y t e [ ] Bi tmapToBytes ( Bitmap img )
{
u s i n g ( MemoryStream s t r e a m = new MemoryStream ( ) )
{
img . Save ( s t r eam , System . Drawing . Imaging . ImageFormat . Png ) ;
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r e t u r n s t r e a m . ToArray ( ) ;
}
}
p r o t e c t e d vo id HideURL_Click ( o b j e c t s ende r , EventArgs e )
{
Bitmap bmp = n u l l ;
Random rnd = new Random ( ) ;
s t r i n g r n d S t r i n g = rnd . Next ( ) . T o S t r i n g ( ) ;
E x t r a c t e d T e x t . Text = " " ;
E r r o r T x t . Text = " " ;
Image1 . ImageUrl = " " ;
t r y
{
i f ( URLText . Text == " " )
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = "URL Text c a n n o t be b l a n k " ;
}
e l s e
i f ( ImageF i l eUp l oad . H a s F i l e )
{
i f ( SteganographyURL . ValidURL ( URLText . Tex t ) )
{
Image1 . ImageUrl = " " ;
i f ( I s V a l i d F i l e ( Conve r t . T o S t r i n g ( ImageF i l eU p load . P o s t e d F i l e . FileName ) ) )
{
i f ( Image1 . ImageUrl == " " )
{
s t r i n g d i r U r l = " u p l o a d s " + t h i s . Page . User . I d e n t i t y . Name ;
s t r i n g d i r P a t h = S e r v e r . MapPath ( d i r U r l ) ;
s t r i n g f i l e U r l = d i r U r l + " / " + Pa th . GetFi leName ( Im ageF i l eUp load . P o s t e d F i l e . FileName ) ;
f i l e U r l = f i l e U r l . Rep lace ( " . " , r n d S t r i n g + " _ . " ) ;
i f ( F i l e . E x i s t s ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) )
{
F i l e . D e l e t e ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) ;
}
ImageF i l eUp load . P o s t e d F i l e . SaveAs ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) ) ;
Image1 . ImageUrl = f i l e U r l ;
u s i n g ( bmp = new Bitmap ( S e r v e r . MapPath ( f i l e U r l ) . T o S t r i n g ( ) ) )
{
i f ( bmp . P i x e l F o r m a t . T o S t r i n g ( ) == " Format1bppIndexed " )
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " Th i s image f o r m a t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d , t h e
image f i l e must have a t l e a s t 8 b i t s p e r p i x e l " ;
bmp = n u l l ;
}
e l s e
i f ( bmp != n u l l )
{
bmp = SteganographyURL . embedText ( URLText . Text , bmp ) ;
b y t e [ ] b y t e s =BitmapToBytes ( bmp ) ;
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s t r i n g b a s e 6 4 S t r i n g = Conve r t . T o B a s e 6 4 S t r i n g ( b y t e s , 0 , b y t e s . Length ) ;
Image1 . ImageUrl= " d a t a : image / png ; base64 , " + b a s e 6 4 S t r i n g ;
E r r o r T x t . Text = "URL has been h idd en i n t h e image " ;
E x t r a c t e d T e x t . Text = " " ;
}
e l s e
{





e l s e
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " Th i s image f o r m a t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d " ;
}
}
e l s e
{




c a t c h ( E x c e p t i o n ex )
{
i f ( ex . Message == " S e t P i x e l i s n o t s u p p o r t e d f o r images wi th i n d e x e d p i x e l f o r m a t s . " )
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " Th i s image does n o t s u p p o r t URL h i d d i n g " ;
}
e l s e
{
E r r o r T x t . Text = " E r r o r Sav ing f i l e " + ex . Message + " " + ex . Data . T o S t r i n g ( ) ;
}
bmp = n u l l ;
i f ( bmp != n u l l ) bmp . Di spose ( ) ;
}
bmp = n u l l ;
}
}
.2 Fingerprint Implementation code
.2.1 Main Function
/ * *
* f p _ a u t h . cc : n o v e l f i n g e r p r i n t a u t h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
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*
* /
# i n c l u d e " f p _ a u t h . h "
# i n c l u d e " opencv2 / imgproc / imgproc . hpp "
# i n c l u d e " opencv2 / h i g h g u i / h i g h g u i . hpp "
# i n c l u d e < v e c t o r >
/ / r e a d i n p u t img and to_match img
/ / g e t s can c i r c l e s from to_match_img
/ / g e t s can c i r c l e s a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s from img
/ / match each c i r c l e wi th to_match_img
/ / check f o r b e s t match
i n t main ( i n t a rgc , c h a r ** a rgv ) {
i n t m a t c h _ r e s u l t =0 , match =0;
i n t m=0 , n =0;
i n t i n n e r _ c i r c l e s ;
i n t MIN_RADIUS , RAD_DIST ;
cv : : Mat im = imread ( " / home / k1505471 / Downloads / s r c / db /104 _ 7 _ t h i n . t i f " , 0 ) ;
/ / i n p u t image , ex . " img_bw /104 _7_ t_ . t i f "
/ / Image pre−p r o c e s s i n g
/ / r e s i z e ( im , im , im . s i z e ( ) , 1 5 0 , 1 5 0 , INTER_LINEAR ) ;
/ / cv : : c v t C o l o r ( im , im , CV_BGR2GRAY ) ;
/ / cv : : a d a p t i v e T h r e s h o l d ( im , im , 2 5 5 ,ADAPTIVE_THRESH_GAUSSIAN_C , THRESH_BINARY, 1 5 , −1 1 ) ;
t h i n n i n g ( im ) ;
/ / C o n v e r t i n g t o b l a c k and w h i t e
/ / cv : : t h r e s h o l d ( im , im , 0 ,255 ,THRESH_BINARY_INV ) ;
/ / l o a d image t o match
cv : : Mat im_match = imread ( " / home / k1505471 / Downloads / s r c / db /104 _ 7 _ t h i n . t i f " , 0 ) ;
/ / image i n DB t o be matched a g a i n s t
/ / Image pre−p r o c e s s i n g
/ / cv : : r e s i z e ( im_match , im_match , im_match . s i z e ( ) , 1 5 0 , 1 5 0 , INTER_LINEAR ) ;
/ / cv : : c v t C o l o r ( im_match , im_match , CV_BGR2GRAY ) ;
/ / cv : : a d a p t i v e T h r e s h o l d ( im_match , im_match , 2 5 5 ,ADAPTIVE_THRESH_GAUSSIAN_C , THRESH_BINARY, 1 5 , −1 1 ) ;
/ / F i n g e r p r i n t T h i n n i n g
t h i n n i n g ( im_match ) ;
/ / C o n v e r t i n g t o b l a c k and w h i t e
/ / cv : : t h r e s h o l d ( im_match , im_match , 0 ,255 ,THRESH_BINARY_INV ) ;
/ * / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / * /
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cout <<" E n t e r t h e Min Radui s " ;
c in >>MIN_RADIUS ;
cout <<" E n t e r t h e Radu i s D i s t " ;
c in >>RAD_DIST ;
cout <<" E n t e r t h e number o f i n n e r c i r l c e s " ;
c in >> i n n e r _ c i r c l e s ;
/ / g e t one c i r c l e p e r p i x e l i n a f i x e d r a d u i s f o r t h e i n p u t image
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > s c a n s = g e t _ s c a n s ( im , MIN_RADIUS , 1 , 1 ) ;
/ / 2d a r r a y o f scan c i r c l e s
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > scans_ma tch = g e t _ s c a n s ( im_match , MIN_RADIUS , 1 , 1 ) ;
s t d : : v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < i n t > > > x _ y _ a x i s ;
x _ y _ a x i s . r e s i z e ( s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
x _ y _ a x i s [ i ] . r e s i z e ( s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ) ;
}
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
f o r ( i n t j =0 ; j < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; j ++){
x _ y _ a x i s [ i ] [ j ] . r e s i z e ( 2 ) ;
}
}
/ * f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
f o r ( i n t j =0 ; j < s c a n s [ i ] . s i z e ( ) ; j ++){
cout << i ; cou t <<" " ; cou t << j ;
cou t << e n d l ;
cou t << x _ y _ a x i s [ i ] [ j ] [ 0 ] ;
cou t << x _ y _ a x i s [ i ] [ j ] [ 1 ] ;
cou t << e n d l ;
}
} * /
/ * f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
f o r ( i n t j =0 ; j < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; j ++){
cout << s c a n s [ i ] [ j ] [ 0 ] ;
cou t << e n d l ;
}
} * /
s t r i n g l e x s t r i n g = l e x ( scans_ma tch [ s c a n s . s i z e ( ) / 2 ] [ s c a n s . s i z e ( ) / 2 ] [ 0 ] ) ;
s t r i n g l e x s t r i n g 1 ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
f o r ( i n t j =0 ; j < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; j ++){
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l e x s t r i n g 1 = l e x ( s c a n s [ i ] [ j ] [ 0 ] ) ;
m a t c h _ r e s u l t =needlemanWunschMatching ( l e x s t r i n g 1 , l e x s t r i n g , l e x s t r i n g . l e n g t h ( ) ) ;
i f ( m a t c h _ r e s u l t >=50){
cout << m a t c h _ r e s u l t ;
cou t << e n d l ; } } }
/ / match ++;
/ / x _ y _ a x i s [m] [ n ] [ 0 ] = i ;
/ / x _ y _ a x i s [m] [ n ] [ 1 ] = j ;
/ / cou t <<" match " ;
/ / cou t << m a t c h _ r e s u l t ;
/ / cou t << e n d l ;
/ / n ++;}
/ / }
/ / i f ( m a t c h _ r e s u l t >=10)
/ /m++;
/ / }
/ / cou t <<match ; cout << e n d l ;
/ / cou t <<m;
/ / cou t <<" " ;
/ / cou t <<n ;
/ / cou t <<m; cout <<" " ; cou t <<n ; * /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ * i f ( m a t c h _ r e s u l t >=80){
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > e x t e n d _ s c a n s ;
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > e x t e n d _ s c a n s _ m a t c h ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++){
f o r ( i n t j =0 ; j < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; j ++){
n o v e l _ m i n u t i a e _ e x t r a c t i o n ( im , e x t e n d _ s c a n s [ i ] [ j ] , MIN_RADIUS , x _ a x i s [ i ] ,








* f p _ f u n c . c : n o v e l f i n g e r p r i n t a u t h f u n c t i o n s
*
* /
# i n c l u d e " f p _ f u n c . h "
# i n c l u d e " i o s t r e a m "
# i n c l u d e " s t r i n g "
do ub l e g e t t i m e ( vo id )
{
s t r u c t t i m e v a l t t i m e ;
g e t t i m e o f d a y ( &t t i m e , 0 ) ;
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r e t u r n t t i m e . t v _ s e c + t t i m e . t v _ u s e c * 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 ;
}
/ *
* Novel M i n u t i a e E x t r a c t i o n p r o c e d u r e .
*
* Th i s f u n c t i o n r e t u r n s a s e t o f c i r c u l a r s t r i n g s h av ing c e n t e r a t ( cx , cy ) a s a 2d s t r i n g v e c t o r .
* For now i t r e t u r n s on ly t h e o u t e r c i r c l e a s a p o i n t e r , however
* a t l e a s t 5 o r 7 s h o u l d be r e t u r n e d f o r b e t t e r compar i son .
* In a d d i t i o n t h e l e n g t h o f t h e c i r c u l a r s t r i n g o b t a i n e d i s r e t u r n e d as w e l l .
* /
i n t n o v e l _ m i n u t i a e _ e x t r a c t i o n ( Mat im , v e c t o r < s t r i n g > &scans , do ub l e r , do ub l e cx , do ub l e cy , i n t i n n e r _ c i r c l e s )
{
s t r i n g s t r _ l = " " ; / / l e f t p a r t o f c i r c u l a r s t r i n g
s t r i n g s t r _ r = " " ; / / r i g h t p a r t o f c i r c u l a r s t r i n g
s t r i n g c i r c u l a r _ s t r = " " ;
i n t c i r c _ s t r _ l e n = 0 ;
s c a n s . r e s i z e ( i n n e r _ c i r c l e s ) ;
/ / f o r each r a d i u s
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < i n n e r _ c i r c l e s ; ++ i , r += RAD_DELTA)
{
f o r ( s i z e _ t x = cx − r ; x <= cx + r ; x++ )
{
f o r ( s i z e _ t y = cy − r ; y <= cy + r ; y++ )
{
/ / a l l p i x e l s i n t h e c i r c l e o f r a d i u s r
/ / ha v in g c e n t e r i n ( cx , cy ) s a t i s f y t h e f o r m u l a :
/ / r ^2 = ( x − cx )^2 + ( y − cy )^2
do ub l e a = ( x − cx ) ;
do ub l e b = ( y − cy ) ;
do ub l e d = a * a + b * b ;
/ / 1 more p i x e l and 1 l e s s p i x e l a l l o w e d
i f ( d < r * ( r + 1) && d > r * ( r − 1 ) )
{
i n t p i x e l = ( i n t ) im . a t < uchar >( x , y ) ;
i f ( y < cy ) {
/ / l e f t emi−c i c l e
s t r _ l = ( p i x e l < 180 ? "0" : " 1 " ) + s t r _ l ;
}
e l s e {
/ / r i g h t emi−c i c l e
s t r _ r = s t r _ r + ( p i x e l < 180 ? "0" : " 1 " ) ;
}
c i r c _ s t r _ l e n ++;
}
}
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}
s c a n s [ i ] = s t r _ l + s t r _ r ;
s t r _ l = " " ;
s t r _ r = " " ;
}
r e t u r n c i r c _ s t r _ l e n ;
}
/ * g e t _ s c a n s e x t r a c t s c i r c u l a r s t r i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from an i n p u t f i n g e r p r i n t * /
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > g e t _ s c a n s ( Mat im , i n t MIN_RADIUS , i n t RAD_DIST , i n t i n n e r _ c i r c l e s )
{
/ * s t a r t c e n t e r o f i n p u t image * /
d oub l e r = MIN_RADIUS ; / / − 2 ; / / r a d i u s
/ / c a l c n . s c a n s p e r row
i n t n _ s c a n s = 0 ;
f o r ( s i z e _ t x = MIN_RADIUS ; x <= im . rows − MIN_RADIUS ; x += RAD_DIST ) n _ s c a n s ++;
v e c t o r < v e c t o r < v e c t o r < s t r i n g > > > s c a n s ; / / 2d v e c t o r o f v e c t o r s can c i r c l e s , i . e . 3d v e c t o r
s c a n s . r e s i z e ( n _ s c a n s ) ;
/ * g e t s can c i r c l e s a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s * /
f o r ( s i z e _ t x = MIN_RADIUS , i = 0 ; x <= im . rows − MIN_RADIUS ; x += RAD_DIST , i ++ )
{
s c a n s [ i ] . r e s i z e ( n _ s c a n s ) ;
f o r ( s i z e _ t y = MIN_RADIUS , j = 0 ; y <= im . c o l s − MIN_RADIUS ; y += RAD_DIST , j ++ )
{
n o v e l _ m i n u t i a e _ e x t r a c t i o n ( im , s c a n s [ i ] [ j ] , r , x , y , i n n e r _ c i r c l e s ) ;
}
}
r e t u r n s c a n s ;
}
i n t l e v e n s h t e i n ( c h a r * s1 , c h a r * s2 )
{
u n s i g n e d i n t s 1 l e n , s 2 l e n , x , y , l a s t d i a g , o l d d i a g ;
s 1 l e n = s t r l e n ( s1 ) ;
s 2 l e n = s t r l e n ( s2 ) ;
u n s i g n e d i n t column [ s 1 l e n + 1 ] ;
f o r ( y = 1 ; y <= s 1 l e n ; y ++)
column [ y ] = y ;
f o r ( x = 1 ; x <= s 2 l e n ; x ++) {
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column [ 0 ] = x ;
f o r ( y = 1 , l a s t d i a g = x−1; y <= s 1 l e n ; y ++) {
o l d d i a g = column [ y ] ;
column [ y ] = MIN3( column [ y ] + 1 , column [ y−1] + 1 , l a s t d i a g + ( s1 [ y−1] == s2 [ x−1] ? 0 : 1 ) ) ;
l a s t d i a g = o l d d i a g ;
}
}
r e t u r n ( column [ s 1 l e n ] ) ;
}
i n t g e t _ d i s t a n c e ( s t r i n g scans , s t r i n g scans_ma tch )
{
c h a r * c _ t e x t = new c h a r [ s cans_ma tch . l e n g t h ( ) + 1 ] ;
s t r c p y ( c _ t e x t , s cans_ma tch . c _ s t r ( ) ) ;
c h a r * c _ p t r n = new c h a r [ s c a n s . l e n g t h ( ) + 1 ] ;
s t r c p y ( c _ p t r n , s c a n s . c _ s t r ( ) ) ;
i n t d i s t = l e v e n s h t e i n ( c _ p t r n , c _ t e x t ) ; / / match i t a t a b o u t t h e c e n t e r o f t h e image t o match
r e t u r n d i s t ;
}
i n t b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t ( s t r i n g scans , s t r i n g scans_ma tch )
{
i n t d i s t = 0 ;
i n t min = 0 ;
i n t r o t a t i o n _ p o s = 0 ;
s t r i n g b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t = " " ;
b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t = s c a n s ;
min = g e t _ d i s t a n c e ( scans , s cans_ma tch ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < s c a n s . s i z e ( ) ; i ++)
{
r o t a t e ( s c a n s . b e g i n ( ) , s c a n s . b e g i n ( ) + 1 , s c a n s . end ( ) ) ;
d i s t = g e t _ d i s t a n c e ( scans , s cans_ma tch ) ;
i f ( d i s t < min )
{
min = d i s t ;
b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t = s c a n s ;
r o t a t i o n _ p o s = i ;
}
}
c o u t << " b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t : " << b e s t _ a l i g n m e n t << e n d l ;
c o u t << " Min d i s t a n c e : " << min << " , r o t a t i o n _ p o s : " << r o t a t i o n _ p o s << e n d l ;
r e t u r n d i s t ;
}
/ * *
* Per fo rm one t h i n n i n g i t e r a t i o n .
* Normal ly you wouldn ’ t c a l l t h i s f u n c t i o n d i r e c t l y from your code .
*
* @param im Bi na r y image wi th r a n g e = 0−1
* @param i t e r 0= even , 1=odd
* /
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vo id t h i n n i n g G u o H a l l I t e r a t i o n ( cv : : Mat& im , i n t i t e r )
{
cv : : Mat marker = cv : : Mat : : z e r o s ( im . s i z e ( ) , CV_8UC1 ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 1 ; i < im . rows ; i ++)
{
f o r ( i n t j = 1 ; j < im . c o l s ; j ++)
{
u c h a r p2 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j ) ;
u c h a r p3 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p4 = im . a t < uchar >( i , j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p5 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p6 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j ) ;
u c h a r p7 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j −1);
u c h a r p8 = im . a t < uchar >( i , j −1);
u c h a r p9 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j −1);
i n t C = ( ! p2 & ( p3 | p4 ) ) + ( ! p4 & ( p5 | p6 ) ) +
( ! p6 & ( p7 | p8 ) ) + ( ! p8 & ( p9 | p2 ) ) ;
i n t N1 = ( p9 | p2 ) + ( p3 | p4 ) + ( p5 | p6 ) + ( p7 | p8 ) ;
i n t N2 = ( p2 | p3 ) + ( p4 | p5 ) + ( p6 | p7 ) + ( p8 | p9 ) ;
i n t N = N1 < N2 ? N1 : N2 ;
i n t m = i t e r == 0 ? ( ( p6 | p7 | ! p9 ) & p8 ) : ( ( p2 | p3 | ! p5 ) & p4 ) ;
i f (C == 1 && (N >= 2 && N <= 3) & m == 0)
marker . a t < uchar >( i , j ) = 1 ;
}
}
im &= ~ marker ;
}
/ * *
* F u n c t i o n f o r t h i n n i n g t h e g i v e n b i n a r y image
*
* @param im Bi na r y image wi th r a n g e = 0−255
* /
vo id t h i n n i n g G u o H a l l ( cv : : Mat& im )
{
im /= 255 ;
cv : : Mat p rev = cv : : Mat : : z e r o s ( im . s i z e ( ) , CV_8UC1 ) ;
cv : : Mat d i f f ;
do {
t h i n n i n g G u o H a l l I t e r a t i o n ( im , 0 ) ;
t h i n n i n g G u o H a l l I t e r a t i o n ( im , 1 ) ;
cv : : a b s d i f f ( im , prev , d i f f ) ;
im . copyTo ( p rev ) ;
}
w h i l e ( cv : : countNonZero ( d i f f ) > 0 ) ;
im *= 255 ;
}
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/ * *
* Code f o r t h i n n i n g a b i n a r y image u s i n g Zhang−Suen a l g o r i t h m .
/ * *
* Per fo rm one t h i n n i n g i t e r a t i o n .
* Normal ly you wouldn ’ t c a l l t h i s f u n c t i o n d i r e c t l y from your code .
*
* @param im Bi na r y image wi th r a n g e = 0−1
* @param i t e r 0= even , 1=odd
* /
vo id t h i n n i n g I t e r a t i o n ( cv : : Mat& im , i n t i t e r )
{
cv : : Mat marker = cv : : Mat : : z e r o s ( im . s i z e ( ) , CV_8UC1 ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 1 ; i < im . rows−1; i ++)
{
f o r ( i n t j = 1 ; j < im . c o l s −1; j ++)
{
u c h a r p2 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j ) ;
u c h a r p3 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p4 = im . a t < uchar >( i , j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p5 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j + 1 ) ;
u c h a r p6 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j ) ;
u c h a r p7 = im . a t < uchar >( i +1 , j −1);
u c h a r p8 = im . a t < uchar >( i , j −1);
u c h a r p9 = im . a t < uchar >( i −1, j −1);
i n t A = ( p2 == 0 && p3 == 1) + ( p3 == 0 && p4 == 1) +
( p4 == 0 && p5 == 1) + ( p5 == 0 && p6 == 1) +
( p6 == 0 && p7 == 1) + ( p7 == 0 && p8 == 1) +
( p8 == 0 && p9 == 1) + ( p9 == 0 && p2 == 1 ) ;
i n t B = p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 + p7 + p8 + p9 ;
i n t m1 = i t e r == 0 ? ( p2 * p4 * p6 ) : ( p2 * p4 * p8 ) ;
i n t m2 = i t e r == 0 ? ( p4 * p6 * p8 ) : ( p2 * p6 * p8 ) ;
i f (A == 1 && (B >= 2 && B <= 6) && m1 == 0 && m2 == 0)
marker . a t < uchar >( i , j ) = 5 ;
}
}
im &= ~ marker ;
}
/ * *
* F u n c t i o n f o r t h i n n i n g t h e g i v e n b i n a r y image
*
* @param im Bi na r y image wi th r a n g e = 0−255
* /
vo id t h i n n i n g ( cv : : Mat& im )
{
im /= 255 ;
cv : : Mat p rev = cv : : Mat : : z e r o s ( im . s i z e ( ) , CV_8UC1 ) ;
cv : : Mat d i f f ;
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do {
t h i n n i n g I t e r a t i o n ( im , 0 ) ;
t h i n n i n g I t e r a t i o n ( im , 1 ) ;
cv : : a b s d i f f ( im , prev , d i f f ) ;
im . copyTo ( p rev ) ;
}
w h i l e ( cv : : countNonZero ( d i f f ) > 0 ) ;
im *= 255 ;
}
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ / F u n c t i o n t o u p d a t e t h e D i r e c t i o n s t r i n g f o r t h e D i r e c t i o n t a b l e
s t r i n g t a b l e U p d a t e F u n c D i r e c ( i n t a , i n t b , i n t c )
{
i f ( a == b && a == c )
{
s t r i n g r e s u l t = " 1 2 3 " ;
r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
}
e l s e i f ( a==b && a > c )
{
s t r i n g r e s u l t = " 1 2 " ;
r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
}
e l s e i f ( a==c && a > b )
{
s t r i n g r e s u l t = " 1 3 " ;
r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
}
e l s e i f ( b==c && b > a )
{
s t r i n g r e s u l t = " 2 3 " ;
r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
}
e l s e
{
i n t f = max ( a , b ) ;
f = max ( f , c ) ;
s t r i n g r e s u l t ;
i f ( f ==a )
{
r e s u l t = " 1 " ;
}
e l s e i f ( f ==b )
{
r e s u l t = " 2 " ;
}
e l s e
{
r e s u l t = " 3 " ;
}
r e t u r n r e s u l t ;
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}
}
i n t t ab l eUpda teFuncMain ( i n t a , i n t b , i n t c )
{
i n t f = max ( a , b ) ;
f = max ( f , c ) ;
r e t u r n f ;
}
/ / F u n c t i o n t o match t h e s e q u e n c e when u p d a t i n g t h e MainTable
i n t match ingFunc ( i n t x , i n t y )
{
i f ( x == y )
r e t u r n 1 ;
e l s e r e t u r n −1;
}
/ / f u n c t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t t h e d i r e c t i o n mapping when t r a c i n g t h e p a t h
/ / 1 −−> d i a g o n a l ( t o p l e f t )
/ / 2 −−> l e f t
/ / 3 −−> t o p
/ / x = d i r e c t i o n , ( y , z ) = p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n
I n t Ve c t r a c e C o o r d ( c h a r x , i n t y , i n t z )
{
I n t Ve c nex tCoord ;
i f ( x == ’ 1 ’ )
{
nex tCoord . c l e a r ( ) ;
nex tCoord . push_back ( y−1);
nex tCoord . push_back ( z−1);
r e t u r n nex tCoord ;
}
e l s e i f ( x == ’ 2 ’ )
{
nex tCoord . c l e a r ( ) ;
nex tCoord . push_back ( y ) ;
nex tCoord . push_back ( z−1);
r e t u r n nex tCoord ;
}
e l s e
{
nex tCoord . c l e a r ( ) ;
nex tCoord . push_back ( y−1);
nex tCoord . push_back ( z ) ;
r e t u r n nex tCoord ;
}
}
i n t needlemanWunschMatching ( s t r i n g t , s t r i n g u , i n t SeqLength ) {
/ / v a r i a b l e d e c l a r a t i o n
/ / i n t SeqLength ;
i n t R ;
s t r i n g s ;
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/ / Ob t a i n l e n g t h o f b i n a r y s e q u e n c e
/ / cou t <<" E n t e r t h e l e n g t h o f s e q u e n c e "<< e n d l ;
/ / c in >> SeqLength ;
i n t Sequence1 [ SeqLength ] ;
i n t Sequence2 [ SeqLength ] ;
/ / Ob ta i n t h e f i r s t b i n a r y s e q u e n c e
/ / cou t <<" E n t e r t h e b i n a r y s e q u e n c e 1"<< e n d l ;
/ / c in >> t ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d uv = 0 ; uv < t . l e n g t h ( ) ; uv ++){
i n t conv = ( i n t ) t [ uv ] − 4 8 ;
Sequence1 [ uv ] = conv ;
}
/ / Ob ta i n t h e second b i n a r y s e q u e n c e
/ / cou t <<" E n t e r t h e b i n a r y s e q u e n c e 2"<< e n d l ;
/ / c i n >> u ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d uv = 0 ; uv < u . l e n g t h ( ) ; uv ++){
i n t conv = ( i n t ) u [ uv ] − 4 8 ;
Sequence2 [ uv ] = conv ;
}
i n t n = SeqLength + 2 ;
i n t rowcount1 , co lumncount1 ;
/ / MainTable h o l d s t h e comple t ed t a b l e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Needleman Wunsch ’ s a l g o r i t h m u s i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g s c o r e sys tem :
/ / +1 f o r match
/ / −1 f o r no match
/ / −1 f o r i n d e l
/ / D i r e c t i o n T a b l e h o l d s t h e d i r e c t i o n s computed a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f o l l o w i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
/ / 1 −−> d i a g o n a l ( t o p l e f t )
/ / 2 −−> l e f t
/ / 3 −−> t o p
i n t MainTable [ n ] [ n ] ;
s t r i n g D i r e c t i o n T a b l e [ n−2][n−2];
/ / i n i t i a l i s e M a i n t a b l e
MainTable [ 0 ] [ 0 ] = 0 ;
MainTable [ 0 ] [ 1 ] = 0 ;
MainTable [ 1 ] [ 0 ] = 0 ;
MainTable [ 1 ] [ 1 ] = 0 ;
/ / E n t e r s e q u e n c e 1
f o r ( co lumncount1 = 2 ; co lumncount1 < n ; co lumncount1 ++){
MainTable [ 0 ] [ co lumncount1 ] = Sequence1 [ co lumncount1 − 2 ] ;
}
/ / E n t e r s e q u e n c e 2
f o r ( rowcount1 = 2 ; rowcount1 < n ; rowcount1 ++){
MainTable [ rowcount1 ] [ 0 ] = Sequence2 [ rowcount1 − 2 ] ;
}
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/ / Upda t ing t h e t a b l e by match ing wi th t h e ’ gap ’ wi th s e q u e n c e 1
f o r ( co lumncount1 = 2 ; co lumncount1 < n ; co lumncount1 ++){
MainTable [ 1 ] [ co lumncount1 ] = MainTable [ 1 ] [ co lumncount1 − 1] − 1 ;
}
/ / Upda t ing t h e t a b l e by match ing wi th t h e ’ gap ’ wi th s e q u e n c e 2
f o r ( rowcount1 = 2 ; rowcount1 < n ; rowcount1 ++){
MainTable [ rowcount1 ] [ 1 ] = MainTable [ rowcount1 − 1 ] [ 1 ] − 1 ;
}
/ / Complete bo th t a b l e s u p d a t e s
/ / number mapping
f o r ( rowcount1 = 2 ; rowcount1 < n ; rowcount1 ++){
f o r ( co lumncount1 = 2 ; co lumncount1 < n ; co lumncount1 ++){
/ / MainTable u p d a t e
MainTable [ rowcount1 ] [ co lumncount1 ] = tab l eUpda teFuncMain ( match ingFunc ( Sequence1 [ co lumncount1 − 2 ] ,
Sequence2 [ rowcount1 − 2 ] ) +
MainTable [ rowcount1 − 1 ] [ co lumncount1 − 1 ] ,
MainTable [ rowcount1 ] [ co lumncount1 − 1]
− 1 , MainTable [ rowcount1 − 1 ] [ co lumncount1 ] − 1 ) ;
/ / D i r e c t i o n Tab le u p d a t e
D i r e c t i o n T a b l e [ rowcount1 − 2 ] [ co lumncount1 − 2] = t a b l e U p d a t e F u n c D i r e c ( match ingFunc ( Sequence1 [ co lumncount1 − 2 ] ,
Sequence2 [ rowcount1 − 2 ] ) +
MainTable [ rowcount1 − 1 ] [ co lumncount1 − 1 ] ,
MainTable [ rowcount1 ] [ co lumncount1 − 1]
− 1 , MainTable [ rowcount1 − 1 ] [ co lumncount1 ] − 1 ) ;
}
}
/ / o b t a i n t h e c o o r d i n a t e s f o r one o f t h e b e s t a l i g n m e n t s
v e c t o r < In tVec > Al ign1 ;
Al ign1 . c l e a r ( ) ;
i n t pp , qq ;
I n t Ve c F i l l ;
F i l l . c l e a r ( ) ;
F i l l . push_back ( SeqLength −1);
F i l l . push_back ( SeqLength −1);
i n t j j = SeqLength −1;
i n t kk = SeqLength −1;
Al ign1 . push_back ( F i l l ) ;
/ / randomly o b t a i n a p a t h a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a l g o r i t h m
do {
s r a n d ( t ime (NULL ) ) ;
i n t r a n = rand ( ) % D i r e c t i o n T a b l e [ j j ] [ kk ] . l e n g t h ( ) ;
pp = t r a c e C o o r d ( D i r e c t i o n T a b l e [ j j ] [ kk ] [ r a n ] , j j , kk ) [ 0 ] ;
qq = t r a c e C o o r d ( D i r e c t i o n T a b l e [ j j ] [ kk ] [ r a n ] , j j , kk ) [ 1 ] ;
j j = pp ;
kk = qq ;
I n t Ve c F i ;
F i . c l e a r ( ) ;
F i . push_back ( pp ) ;
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Fi . push_back ( qq ) ;
Al ign1 . push_back ( F i ) ;
} w h i l e ( pp >=0 && qq > = 0 ) ;
i f ( pp <0 && qq < 0){
Al ign1 . e r a s e ( Al ign1 . b e g i n ( ) + ( Al ign1 . s i z e ( ) −1 ) ) ;
}
I n t Ve c sq1 ;
I n t Ve c sq2 ;
i n t MatchScore= 0 ;
do ub l e P e r c e n t M a t c h ;
/ / o u t p u t t h e o b t a i n e d match / a l i g n m e n t and p e r c e n t a g e match
i n t yyy = 0 ;
i n t xxx = 0 ;
i n t sma r t 1 = 100 ;
i n t sma r t 2 = 100 ;
f o r ( i n t f c o u n t = Al ign1 . s i z e ( ) ; f c o u n t > 0 ; f c o u n t −−){
i f ( Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1] [1 ] < 0){
/ / cou t < <"−";
sq1 . push_back ( 2 ) ;
}
e l s e i f ( Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1] [1 ] == sm ar t1 ) {
/ / cou t < <"−";
sq1 . push_back ( 2 ) ;
}
e l s e {
/ / cou t <<Sequence1 [ xxx ] ;
sq1 . push_back ( Sequence1 [ xxx ] ) ;
xxx ++;
}
sm ar t1 = Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1 ] [ 1 ] ;
}
f o r ( i n t f c o u n t = Al ign1 . s i z e ( ) ; f c o u n t > 0 ; f c o u n t −−){
i f ( Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1] [0 ] < 0){
/ / cou t < <"−";
sq2 . push_back ( 2 ) ;
}
e l s e i f ( Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1] [0 ] == sm ar t2 ) {
/ / cou t < <"−";
sq2 . push_back ( 2 ) ;
}
e l s e {
/ / cou t <<Sequence2 [ yyy ] ;
sq2 . push_back ( Sequence2 [ yyy ] ) ;
yyy ++;
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}
sm ar t2 = Al ign1 [ f c o u n t −1 ] [ 0 ] ;
}
/ / Computing and P r i n t i n g t h e P e r c e n t a g e Match c a l c u l a t e d as :
/ / T o t a l match s c o r e
/ / P e r c e n t a g e Match = −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− * 100
/ / Length o f s e q u e n c e
/ /
f o r ( u n s i g n e d s c o r e = 0 ; s c o r e < sq1 . s i z e ( ) ; s c o r e ++){
i f ( sq1 [ s c o r e ] == 2 | | sq2 [ s c o r e ] == 2){
MatchScore−−;
}
e l s e i f ( sq1 [ s c o r e ] != sq2 [ s c o r e ] ) {
MatchScore−−;
}




i f ( MatchScore >= 0){
P e r c e n t M a t c h = ( ( do ub l e ) MatchScore / ( do ub l e ) SeqLength ) *100 ;
}
e l s e {
P e r c e n t M a t c h = 0 ;
}
r e t u r n P e r c e n t M a t c h ;
}
i n t z e r o D i s t a n c e ( i n t c , map< i n t , i n t > d )
{
i n t x ;
i n t y = 0 ;
map< i n t , i n t > : : i t e r a t o r i t ;
i t = d . f i n d ( c ) ;
i f ( i t == d . end ( ) ) r e t u r n −1;
e l s e i f ( ( * i t ) . second != 0) r e t u r n −1;
e l s e
{
f o r ( map< i n t , i n t > : : i t e r a t o r i t x = i t ; i t x != d . end ( ) ; i t x ++){
i f ( i t x −> f i r s t != i t −> f i r s t )
{
y ++;




i f ( x == −1 ) r e t u r n x ;
e l s e r e t u r n y ;
}
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}
long z e r o D i s t ( i n t c , v e c t o r < i n t > d )
{
i n t f = 0 ;
v e c t o r < i n t > nn ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d u = c ; u < d . s i z e ( ) ; u ++){
i f ( d [ u ] == 1) f =1;
i f ( f == 1) nn . push_back ( d [ u ] ) ;
}
f o r ( i n t u = 0 ; u < c ; u ++){
nn . push_back ( d [ u ] ) ;
}
s t d : : o s t r i n g s t r e a m o s s ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d u = 0 ; u < nn . s i z e ( ) ; u ++){
oss <<nn [ u ] ;
}
s t r i n g num = o s s . s t r ( ) ;
l ong number = a t o l ( num . c _ s t r ( ) ) ;
r e t u r n number ;
}
s t r i n g l e x ( s t r i n g i n p u t _ d a t a ) {
v e c t o r < i n t > i n p u t , i n p u t x , s t r o u t ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d p =0; p< i n p u t _ d a t a . l e n g t h ( ) ; p ++){
i n p u t . push_back ( ( i n t ) i n p u t _ d a t a [ p ] − 4 8 ) ;
}
map< i n t , i n t > l a b s t r g ;
map< i n t , i n t > : : i t e r a t o r i t 1 , i t 2 ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d p =0; p< i n p u t _ d a t a . l e n g t h ( ) ; p ++){
l a b s t r g [ p ] = i n p u t [ p ] ;
i n p u t x . push_back ( p ) ;
}
i n t i t e r a t i o n s = 0 ;
f o r ( i n t i =1 ; i < i n p u t _ d a t a . l e n g t h ( ) ; i ++){
i f ( u n s i g n e d ( pow ( 2 . 0 , i ) ) >= i n p u t _ d a t a . l e n g t h ( ) )
{
i t e r a t i o n s = i ;
b r e a k ;
}
}
f o r ( i n t v =0; v< i t e r a t i o n s ; v ++){
v e c t o r < i n t > s t g r e s ;
i n t t t t = ( i n t ) ( i n p u t x . s i z e ( ) / 2 ) ;
/ / cou t << t t t < < " , " ;
f o r ( i n t t =0 ; t < ( i n t ) ( i n p u t x . s i z e ( ) / 2 ) ; t ++){
i t 1 = l a b s t r g . f i n d ( i n p u t x [2 * t ] ) ;
i t 2 = l a b s t r g . f i n d ( i n p u t x [ ( 2 * t ) + 1 ] ) ;
i f ( ( * i t 1 ) . second != (* i t 2 ) . second )
{
/ / d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s ; so s e l e c t t h e s m a l l e r one
i f ( ( * i t 1 ) . second < (* i t 2 ) . second ) s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t ) ;
e l s e s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 2 ) . f i r s t ) ;
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}
e l s e i f ( ( * i t 1 ) . second == 1)
{
/ / Both v a l u e s a r e 1
i f ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t < (* i t 2 ) . f i r s t ) s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t ) ;
e l s e s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 2 ) . f i r s t ) ;
}
e l s e
{
/ / Both v a l u e s a r e z e r o
i f ( v == 0)
{
s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t ) ;
}
e l s e
{
i f ( z e r o D i s t ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t , i n p u t ) < z e r o D i s t ( ( * i t 2 ) . f i r s t , i n p u t ) ) s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t ) ;
e l s e i f ( z e r o D i s t ( ( * i t 1 ) . f i r s t , i n p u t ) > z e r o D i s t ( ( * i t 2 ) . f i r s t , i n p u t ) ) s t g r e s . push_back ( ( * i t 2 ) . f i r s t ) ;




i f ( i n p u t x . s i z e ( ) % 2 > 0)
{
s t g r e s . push_back ( i n p u t x [ i n p u t x . s i z e ( ) − 1 ] ) ;
}
i n p u t x . c l e a r ( ) ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d u = 0 ; u < s t g r e s . s i z e ( ) ; u ++){
i n p u t x . push_back ( s t g r e s [ u ] ) ;
/ / cou t << s t g r e s [ u ] < <" , " ;
}
cout << e n d l ;
}
i n t r e s u l t = i n p u t x [ 0 ] ;
/ / cou t <<" Th i s d i g i t s e l e c t e d as t h e l e a s t l e x i c o g r a p h i c a l r o t a t i o n o f t h e s t r i n g i s :" < < e n d l ;
/ / cou t << r e s u l t << e n d l ;
/ / C o r r e c t s t r i n g o u t p u t r o t a t i o n i s
f o r ( u n s i g n e d u = r e s u l t ; u < i n p u t . s i z e ( ) ; u ++){
s t r o u t . push_back ( i n p u t [ u ] ) ;
}
f o r ( i n t u = 0 ; u < r e s u l t ; u ++){
s t r o u t . push_back ( i n p u t [ u ] ) ;
}
s t r i n g s t r e a m s s ;
s t r i n g s t r 1 ;
/ / cou t <<"The s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f s t r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t o be used f o r ma tch ing w i t h i n t h e d a t a b a s e i s : "<< e n d l ;
f o r ( u n s i g n e d u = 0 ; u < s t r o u t . s i z e ( ) ; u ++){
/ / cou t << s t r o u t [ u ] ;
/ / cou t << e n d l ;
ss << s t r o u t [ u ] ;
s t r 1 = s s . s t r ( ) ;
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}
/ / cou t << s t r ;
/ / cou t << e n d l ;
/ / cou t << s t r . l e n g t h ( ) ;
/ / cou t << e n d l ;
/ / cou t << s t r o u t . s i z e ( ) ;
r e t u r n s t r 1 ;
}
